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ABSTRACT 
 
With few exceptions, airport ground access tends to be an issue that is overlooked by 
airlines, airport operators, and metropolitan planning organizations.  Given the current 
structure of federal aviation and surface transportation funding, little incentive is 
provided for these organizations to develop a comprehensive intermodal outlook towards 
airport access projects. 
 
Given the concurrent reauthorization during the next legislative session of several major 
pieces of authorizing legislation involving domestic transportation projects, including 
TEA-21 (surface transportation) and AIR-21 (aviation and airports), it would be the ideal 
time to implement a program for airport ground access projects that bridges these areas. 
 
Under such an intermodal system, a solitary federal office, such as the Office of 
Intermodalism, would become both a central repository for technical guidance, as well as 
a central source of regulation and interpretation of federal law.  In addition, a mixture of 
local and federal funds should be used to encourage cooperation between the various 
entities involved with a ground access project, such as the airport owner/operator, 
regional transit operator, metropolitan planning organization, and the state highway 
authority. 
 
The proposed authorizing legislation would allow an airport operator to levy a Passenger 
Facility Charge (PFC) beyond current regulatory limits, subject to the approval of the 
Office of Intermodalism.  Further, new categorized surface transportation funds would be 
authorized, which could be used by the Office of Intermodalism as a match to PFC 
funding.  The remaining funding would be provided by local sources. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction: The Belief that Airport Ground Access is ‘Someone Else’s Problem’ 
 
 
 
12 miles on an access road between the terminal and the closest highway.1  
$40 taxi fares to downtown.2  Waits of up to an hour just to leave the 
airport property.3  Promises of enhanced train service that failed to be 
implemented.4 
 
On the surface, these descriptions seem like they might come from an airport 
dreamed up from a frequent flyer’s worst nightmare.  Unfortunately, all of these 
problems came true when the new Denver International Airport opened on February 28, 
1995.  Although some of these issues have since been mitigated, all of them might have 
been avoided had the planners of the new Denver airport considered the issues 
surrounding ground access during the initial planning and construction of the airport.  
Unfortunately, “[t]he airport planners saw their immediate problem as the airport’s costs, 
and they viewed ground access as a local, regional, or state transportation planning 
matter.”5  Although some of these problems were unique to the opening of the new 
Denver airport, as it was the first totally new airport to open in the United States since the 
1974 opening of the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport, ground access is a 
significant problem at many of today’s large airports within the United States. 
In this context, ground access is defined as the facilities, infrastructure, and 
operations required to get passengers, meters/greeters, airport and airline employees, as 
well as air freight and cargo between their local and regional point of origin/destination 
                                                 
1 Paul Stephen Dempsey, Andrew R. Goetz, and Joseph S. Szyliowicz, Denver International Airport: 
Lessons Learned (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997), 273. 
2 Ibid., 272. 
3 Ibid., 278. 
4 Ibid., 276-277. 
5 Ibid., 273. 
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and their respective airport facility (i.e., passengers to airline terminals, and air freight to 
on-site warehouses/freight receiving facilities).  Generally speaking, this infrastructure is 
either within the control of the airport owner/operator, or can reasonably be inferred as 
connected to the operations of the airport.  However, ground access (in this context) does 
not focus on intra-airport passenger and freight movements, although these movements 
may possibly utilize some of the ground access infrastructure defined above. 
 
Historical perspective.  
Traditionally, airport owners/operators have considered themselves exactly that: 
the operator of the airport.  They are responsible for all airside operations: for instance, 
ensuring the airport is successful financially (however that might be defined), that the 
airlines are happy with the facility and its operation, that the various concession vendors 
are accommodated, and that at least a minimum level of comfort is provided for the 
passengers passing through. 
How passengers, employees, and cargo6 reach the airport, however, is a different 
story altogether.  Beyond the roadways that immediately abut the airport facilities and 
that are on airport property, most airport owner/operators could care less how passengers 
arrive at the terminal, as long as they keep arriving in a reliable and timely manner.  Any 
problems that might arise over this issue are seen as falling under the jurisdiction of local 
and regional transportation authorities, and airport owner/operators generally leave such 
problems to these authorities to work out. 
                                                 
6 For ease of reference, throughout this paper the use of the term “passengers” should also be read to 
include airport employees and air freight, unless explicitly stated otherwise.  Likewise, any related 
terminology (e.g., terminal) may be substituted for the analogous concept (e.g., freight facility). 
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Conversely, local and regional transportation planners generally view airport 
owner/operators responsible for the traffic they generate.  Airports are very heavy traffic 
demand generators; the new Denver airport handles about 30,000 vehicles per day, based 
on traffic counts performed on its sole access road.7  Other airports generate significantly 
more traffic; Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport, for instance, experiences traffic 
flows of approximately 100,000 vehicles per day, and similar to the Denver, has only one 
entrance/exit point.8 
For this reason, most local and regional surface transportation planners and 
authorities consider the airport owner/operator at least partially responsible for ground 
access issues.  Further, the local or regional authority is responsible for all surface 
transportation programs within their jurisdiction, and must distribute its resources and 
funding as optimally as possible in order to meet the most pressing needs.  Most of these 
pieces of independent infrastructure must receive their sole funding for repair, 
rehabilitation, or improvement from the limited pool of money that the authority has 
access to, and are therefore generally placed higher on priority lists than airport ground 
access projects, particularly since the dominant view is that the ‘wealthy airport’ can 
handle its own problems. 
With neither side taking responsibility, the end result is somewhat obvious.  
Infrastructure that is desperately required is never build, services that would prove useful 
never get organized, and the pieces that already exist fail to receive the attention they 
require.  Since neither side is generally willing to approach the problem of airport ground 
                                                 
7 Ibid., 276. 
8 Lawrence F. Cunningham and James H. Gerlach, Ground Access Assessment of North American Airport 
Locations (Denver, CO: University of Colorado at Denver, September 1996), II-84, NTIS, PB97-155345. 
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access alone, we must determine whether any sort of system can be developed that would 
encourage one or both parties involved to take a vested interest in these issues. 
Most individuals recognize the superiority of our European counterparts within 
this realm—multiple European cities feature relatively seamless transit links between 
their airports and urban downtowns, as well as links to a wider regional transportation 
network.  These links are generally intuitive, usable by arriving visitors completely 
unfamiliar with the transit system, and yet are comprehensive enough that many local 
residents use these networks because the are fast, convenient, provide service to where 
they are traveling from, and are relatively inexpensive compared to the alternatives.  
Although the United States will not be able to obtain this European idea for many years, 
steps can be taken to ensure that domestic ground access issues are brought ahead to the 
twenty-first century. 
 
The Approach 
This research will investigate current stumbling blocks that exist in the planning 
and implementation of airport ground access projects, and more importantly will attempt 
to develop a model that encourages one or both parties to take an interest in these issues.  
Generally, the goal of this research is to create an incentive scheme that will reward those 
airports and surface transportation agencies that work towards solving ground access 
problems.  Specifically, the results of this research will be applied towards ground access 
projects that are currently in the planning stages.  Specifically, several proposals have 
been floated in Chicago to develop a dedicated ‘Airport Express’ train linking O’Hare 
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International Airport, and possibly Midway Airport, with ‘the loop’ (Chicago’s 
downtown core). 
In order to determine what approaches might be successful to achieve these goals, 
we will first look at current practices.  Specifically, a number of different funding sources 
are available to finance airport ground access projects, and each source has different 
advantages and disadvantages.  For instance, some sources are only available to airport 
owners/operators, while other sources of funds are targeted towards local and regional 
surface transportation agencies.  Some funds are available as outright grants, while others 
are merely temporary loans or bonds that must be paid back over a period of time.  
Among the bonds that may be issued to finance these projects, there are many different 
types, each type with its own benefits and detractions. 
It must be noted that the case studies outlined within this thesis generally deal 
with providing transit access to airports.  This is primarily because the best examples 
within the project realm of airport ground access involve transit.  However, many of the 
principles gleaned from these transit-oriented examples are applicable on a broader scale, 
whether the project involves highway access, rail access, bus access, or truck access.  
Airport ground access is a multimodal problem, and many different modes may be 
considered or utilized to solve this problem, from the water taxis and ferries that service 
Boston’s Logan International Airport to intercity rail access linked with the 
Baltimore/Washington International Airport. 
Next, the practical advantages and disadvantages of using various organization 
and financing methods will be examined through several case studies of large U.S. 
airports.  Three specific airports have been chosen as case studies, two of which are in the 
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final stages of completing a major enhancement to their ground access infrastructure.  In 
New York City, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey is putting the final 
touches on a new rail system at John F. Kennedy International Airport which not only 
links the terminals, but provides service to allow passengers to connect to the New York 
City Subway as well as the Long Island Rail Road.  This system was designed, 
constructed and funded completely under the jurisdiction of the Port Authority. 
On the other side of the country, the San Francisco International Airport and the 
Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system is nearing completion of a major project 
extending BART into the terminal area of the San Francisco Airport, as well as further 
extending the BART system into San Mateo County.  Due to the multiple jurisdictional 
aspects of this project, funding was provided through multiple sources, including San 
Mateo county, the city and county of San Francisco, as well as the San Francisco Port 
Authority, operator of the airport.  The Bay Area Rapid Transit District, owner/operator 
of the BART system, coordinated the actual construction of the new BART link. 
In the above two case studies, careful attention will be paid to the organizational 
structures that were established during the planning and construction phases of the 
ground access projects, as well as the funding sources utilized in the completion of these 
projects.  In contrast, the third case study will be of the new Denver International Airport.  
Unlike the other two case studies, the amount of effort put into designing the ground 
access infrastructure was minimal at best.  Thus, this case will be useful at demonstrating 
ways in which the process can go awry, as well as provide a backdrop for testing the 
results of this research. 
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The Proposal 
Using the case studies, I will hypothesize that incentives should be provided by 
the federal government to encourage cooperation between the various airport and surface 
transportation agencies involved with airport ground access projects.  Currently, funding 
is restricted based on who is applying for the funding.  Therefore, there is no current 
incentive for airport owners/operators to work in conjunction with surface transportation 
agencies in the planning or construction of these projects.  At best, this results in minor 
inefficiencies; at worst, this results in projects that are grossly misaligned (e.g., a train to 
‘nowhere’) or needed improvements that never get off the ground.  The simultaneous 
reauthorization of AIR-21 and TEA-21 appropriations legislation, both of which must 
originate in the Public Works Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, provides 
a unique situation that lends itself to cooperative legislation.  Using this opportunity, it is 
believed that a new funding provision should be included in both pieces of 
reauthorization legislation that provides for funds dedicated towards airport ground 
access projects (i.e. a fraction of the funds can come from each of the two pieces of 
legislation).  However, in order for public agencies to tap into these funds, airport 
owners/operators and surface transportation agencies must demonstrate that they are 
working together in developing the ground access project in question.  Providing fiscal 
incentives would help to allow the ability to focus on the intermodal issues that have 
fallen through the cracks, while promoting the reduction of bureaucratic duplications and 
inefficiencies. 
21 
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Chapter Two 
Current Funding Sources 
 
Funding for airport access projects can be split into two broad categories: funding 
that is accessible by the airport operating authority, and funding that is accessible by the 
surface transportation agency.  Each type of funding source has its own advantages, 
disadvantages, and restrictions.  Many of these restrictions are due to various federal 
regulations, although some funds may be controlled by various contractual obligations. 
 
Airport Funding Sources 
There are four main sources of funds that airport authorities have access to: 
passenger facility charge (PFC) revenues, federal grants, state and local grants, and 
retained airport revenues (such as landing fees, parking charges, and concession fees).  
All four of these can be leveraged to provide capital funds through bonding.  Airports 
depend on these different sources to varying degrees, table 2-1 indicates the amount and 
share of each of these sources for large- and medium-hub airports in the United States in 
1996. 
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Funding Source 
Amount
(millions)
 
Share 
Passenger facility charges $1,005 18.0% 
Federal AIP grants $592 10.6% 
Airport retained earnings $257 4.6% 
Special facility bonds $167 3.0% 
State and local grants $95 1.7% 
Airport revenue bonds $3,468 62.1% 
     Total $5,584 100.0%
Table 2-1. 1996 funding sources for large- and medium-hub U.S. airports.9 
 
Revenue bond proceeds.  Most airport operating agencies have the authority to 
issue bonds to fund capital improvements, secured via several different methods.  General 
airport revenue bonds (GARBs) are secured using the overall revenues of the airport, and 
any other revenues that may be defined within the bond itself.  PFC revenues may also 
back bonds; a further discussion of the use of PFCs follows.  Special facility bonds are 
backed by the revenues generated solely from the facility that was constructed using the 
bonds.  Finally, general obligation bonds are guaranteed by the overall tax base of the 
issuing entity.10 
As with any bond issuance, the ability of the airport authority to sell bonds is 
based upon a number of factors.  The airport’s debt structure; its management, 
administration and scope of operations; its revenue structure and financial operations; and 
its economic base and physical plant all determine the rate that a specific bond issue can 
                                                 
9 United States General Accounting Office, Airport Financing, Comparing Funding Sources with Planned 
Development (1998). 
10 Transportation Research Board—National Research Council, TCRP Report 62: Improving Public 
Transportation Access to Large Airports (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2000), 129. 
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be sold at, and whether or not the issue will sell at all.11  Most creditors look towards one 
of the major bond rating companies, such as Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s, to assess 
these factors and assign both the airport authority and the bond issuance a rating 
indicating its creditworthiness. 
Airport revenue bonds also have the advantage that the interest income is exempt 
from federal income tax.  This provides a further incentive for investors to purchase these 
bonds, and allows the airport authority to price their bonds at a slightly lower rate without 
changing their post-income tax earnings.  According to the FAA, “[t]he Federal tax 
exemption shaves almost two full percentage points off interest costs for airport 
borrowers of all sizes, an estimated saving of nearly $1 billion per year for airports over 
the period 1985 to 1993.”12  Of course, the federal treasury loses a greater amount of 
money through this tax incentive than the benefit received by the local authority, leading 
to some questioning of the efficiency of this incentive.  On the other hand, such tax 
expenditures provide a decentralized mechanism to encourage capital formation in public 
entities without the bureaucratic overhead required for appropriated funds. 
With respect to airport ground access improvements, the restriction on the use of 
these funds is generally set by the terms of the bond issue itself.  Of course, the airport 
operator must be able to pay back these bonds on-time, or risk default, and the investors 
must be reasonably assured that the risk of the bonds defaulting is minimal, or at the very 
least commensurate with the interest rate attached to the bond issue. 
 
                                                 
11 Christopher R. Rowley, “Comment: Financing Airport Capital Development: The Aviation Industry’s 
Greatest Challenge,”  Journal of Air Law and Commerce 63 (February/March 1998): 616. 
12 Federal Aviation Administration, Innovative Approaches for Using Federal Funds to Finance Airport 
Development (1996). 
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Airport Improvement Program (AIP) Grant Funds.  Under the Airway 
Revenue Act of 1970, the U.S. Congress established the Airport and Airway Trust Fund.  
Various taxes and user fees support this trust fund, including an airline ticket tax, a tax on 
air freight, a nationwide international departure fee, and taxes on general aviation fuel. 
The Airport Improvement Program (AIP) grant program was established under 
the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 (AAIA), using revenues from this trust 
fund to assist in the development of public-use airports.  The AAIA denoted a formula for 
the distribution of these funds, as well as specified eligible recipients of these grants.  The 
AIP program has been modified by various pieces of legislation in 1983, 1987, 1990, 
1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, and 2000.13 
The federal Department of Transportation (DOT), including the FAA, has issued 
various regulations on the use of AIP grants; a number of these regulations specifically 
relate to airport ground access projects.  Access roads and auxiliary facilities may be 
funded using AIP grants, if the following provisions are met: (1) the access road may 
extend only to the nearest public highway of sufficient capacity to accommodate airport 
traffic; (2) the access road must be located on the airport or within a right-of-way 
acquired by the airport sponsor; (3) the access road must exclusively serve airport 
traffic;14 (4) more than one access road is eligible if the airport traffic is of sufficient 
volume to require more than one road; and (5) related facilities such as acceleration and 
deceleration lanes, exit and exit ramps, street lighting, and bus stops are also eligible 
                                                 
13 Transportation Research Board, 130. 
14 If a section of access road does not serve airport traffic, this particular section is ineligible for AIP grant 
funds; however, this does not effect the eligibility of other portions of the road that otherwise meet the 
eligibility requirements. 
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when they are a necessary part of an eligible road.15  Examples of ineligible projects 
include those that serve non-aviation-related facilities, or for roads that connect parking 
facilities to access roads. 
Likewise, the DOT and FAA have set forth similar requirements for transit 
facilities that serve public airports.  AIP grants may be used towards transit projects if the 
project being funded primarily services the airport.  As transit projects tend to be more 
complicated and integrated than roadways, the FAA reviews these applications on a case-
by-case basis.  Historically, the FAA has looked towards the eligibility requirements 
outlined above for access roadways to guide its decisions on whether or not an airport-
related transit project is eligible for AIP grants.  However, as a practical matter, the FAA 
has made it clear that if an on-airport facility has both airport and general uses, it is 
ineligible to receive AIP funds under the current regulations.16 
 
Passenger Facility Charges.  The Aviation Safety and Capacity Expansion Act 
of 1990 gave airports the power, with federal approval, to tax enplaning passengers $1, 
$2, or $3 under the provision of a passenger facility charge (PFC).  Under this act, these 
funds must be spent on PFC-eligible projects, which include capital improvements that 
help to “preserve or enhance safety, capacity, or security of the national air transportation 
system; reduce noise from an airport that is part of the system; or furnish opportunities 
for enhanced competition between or among air carriers.”17  The individual airlines are 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
16 Federal Aviation Administration, Airport Improvement Program Handbook (May 31, 2002), par. 622(b). 
17 Transportation Research Board, 131. 
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responsible for the collection and distribution of PFC funds, and are permitted to keep a 
small percentage of these funds to cover administrative costs.18 
The Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century 
(AIR-21) allowed the amount to be collected from each passenger to increase to $4 or 
$4.50, again with federal approval.  However, additional eligibility requirements must be 
met if the airport authority wishes to collect PFCs in excess of $3 per enplanements.  For 
medium- and large-hub airports, these requirements state that the airport operator must 
demonstrate that “(1) a project will make significant contributions to improving safety 
and security, to increasing competition, to reducing current or anticipated congestion, or 
to reducing the impact of noise; and (2) the project cannot otherwise be paid from [airport 
improvement program funds].”  Further, if these funds are to be used for surface or 
terminal projects, the airport operator must demonstrate that adequate provisions have 
been made for the financing of airside needs.19 
The authorizing legislation does not set specific eligibility requirements, beyond 
those outlined above.  Administration of the PFC program is handled under the FAA, and 
in 1991 the FAA issued a final rule regulating PFC funding.  Ground transportation 
projects are PFC eligible if the public agency in charge of the airport owns or acquires the 
right-of-way and any necessary additional land for the project.  On the other hand, the 
rule is silent on the permissible modes of transportation for airport access projects, as 
well as the geographical proximity of the project to the airport.  Instead, the FAA 
                                                 
18 Rowley, 618-619. 
19 Transportation Research Board, 131. 
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Administrator will review each application for use of PFC funds towards ground access 
projects on a case-by-case basis.20 
PFC funds may be used on a ‘pay-as-you-go’ basis, where they are spent as they 
are received by the airport authority, or may be used to secure and retire debt from airport 
capital development projects.  This ability to issue debt products that are protected by 
PFC revenues is very powerful, particularly for extremely large airports that have the 
majority of passenger enplanements in this country.  Further, although airport authorities 
must consult with airlines and airport tenants regarding the use of PFC funds, the ultimate 
decision is left in the hands of the airport, as it was felt that the airport operator would 
have greater incentives than the airlines to make long-term capital investments.21  
Further, there is no consultation with other groups that might have interests in the use of 
PFC funds, such as regional MPOs, freight shippers, passenger interest groups, and travel 
agents. 
As demonstrated in table 2-2, passenger facility charges are also becoming a 
significant source of revenue for domestic airports.  In 2001, $1.585 billion was collected 
in PFCs by airport authorities, and the estimated total for 2002 is that over $2 billion will 
be collected in PFCs.  Between 1992 and 2001, inclusive, domestic airports collected 
$10.9 billion in PFCs.  Although the airline industry has suffered a downturn over the 
past two years, because of the depressed economy as well as the events of September 11, 
2001, the FAA does not anticipate that PFC revenues will decrease.  Although the 
targeted prediction of $2 billion in PFCs collected during the 2002 calendar year was not 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
21 Rowley, 619. 
29 
actually met, over $1.8 billion was actually collected, exceeding the amount collected in 
2001.22 
 
 
Calendar Year
PFCs collected,
All U.S. airports
1992 $85,437,686
1993 $485,112,053
1994 $849,330,244
1995 $1,046,234,802
1996 $1,113,999,014
1997 $1,222,882,438
1998 $1,448,671,813
1999 $1,514,695,981
2000 $1,557,221,630
2001 $1,585,300,074
2002 (est.) $2,019,000,000
Table 2-2.  Annual PFC collections.23 
 
As previously mentioned, PFC funds can be used towards certain airport capital 
development projects, such as improving security, capacity or safety, reducing noise 
impacts, or improving competition between airlines.  Airport operators have taken 
advantage of PFC funds to work on projects involving all of these issues, table 2-3 shows 
the breakdown of project types, based upon the percentage of PFC dollars directed 
towards each project type.  Notably, ten percent of the total PFC funds collected are 
being spent on ground access projects; this total is adjusted to eleven percent if the new 
Denver International Airport is removed from the data.24  This information relating to 
                                                 
22 Federal Aviation Administration, Passenger Facility Charges Branch, Key Passenger Facility Charge 
Statistics As of April 1, 2003; available from http://www2.faa.gov/arp/financial/pfc/reports/stats.cfm; 
Internet; accessed 29 April 2003. 
23 Federal Aviation Administration, Passenger Facility Charges Branch, Key Passenger Facility Charge 
Statistics As of January 1, 2003; available from http://www2.faa.gov/arp/financial/pfc/reports/stats.cfm; 
Internet; accessed 17 January 2003. 
24 Federal Aviation Administration, Passenger Facility Charges Branch, Distribution of PFC Funds 
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ground access projects is further broken down in table 2-4; note, however, that table 2-4 
reflects information on PFCs that have been approved by the FAA, but does not 
necessarily reflect funds that have actually been collected. 
 
Category Distribution of PFC funds 
Landside 30% 
Interest on PFC bonds 28% 
Airside 17% 
Access 10% 
New Denver airport 8% 
Noise 6% 
Table 2-3.  Distribution of PFC Funds with 
New Denver International Airport 
as of December 31, 2002.25 
 
Project Type Amount Percent
Roads $1,557,960,349 38.8 
Rail $2,411,466,435 60.0 
Land $19,468,364 0.5 
Planning $30,886,594 0.8 
   Total $4,019,781,742 100.0 
Table 2-4.  Approved Passenger Facility Charges, 
Access, as of December 31, 2002.26 
 
Of course, due to the nature of the passenger facility charge as a “head tax,” they 
are most favorable to the largest airports in the U.S., or more specifically those airports 
with a very large number of passenger boardings.  The FAA limits the amount of AIP 
grants that large airports are eligible to receive based upon their collection of PFCs.  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
without New Denver As of December 31, 2002; available from 
http://www2.faa.gov/arp/financial/pfc/reports/nodenver.cfm; Internet; accessed 17 January 2003. 
25 Federal Aviation Administration, Passenger Facility Charges Branch, Distribution of PFC Funds with 
New Denver As of December 31, 2002; available from 
http://www2.faa.gov/arp/financial/pfc/reports/denver.cfm; Internet; accessed 17 January 2003. 
26 Federal Aviation Administration, Passenger Facility Charges Branch, Approved Passenger Facility 
Charges by Categories As of December 31, 2002; available from 
http://www2.faa.gov/arp/financial/pfc/reports/category.cfm; Internet; accessed 17 January 2003. 
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AIR-21 legislation requires an airport operator to forfeit 75 percent of its passenger-based 
AIP entitlement if an airport receives authorization to collect PFCs at the $4 or $4.50 
level.  Although this may appear as a harsh penalty on the airport operator (particularly 
since a disproportionately high percentage of the ticket taxes which support AIP grants 
originate at large airports), in practice the airports that collect PFCs at the $4 or $4.50 
level receive significantly more income from collecting PFCs at these elevated levels 
than the value of the AIP grants forfeited.  This allows AIP funds to cover a larger 
proportion of the needs of smaller airports. 
The PFC eligibility determination for airport ground access projects by the FAA 
is essentially the same as those for AIP grant eligibility.  For instance, a on-airport 
shared-use (airport and general use) transit facility would not be eligible for PFC funding, 
just as it would be ineligible for AIP grant funding.27 
 
Airport Revenues.  Most large airports in the United States generate a net 
income for the airport owner/operator, via a combination of landing fees, parking 
charges, concession rentals and fees, and other revenue sources.  However, various 
federal laws restrict the use of these revenues.  The AIAA required that airport operators 
“use all revenues generated by the airport for the capital or operating costs of the airport, 
the local airport system, or other local facilities which are owned or operated by the 
owner or operator of the airport and directly related to the actual transportation of 
passengers or property.”28 
                                                 
27 Transportation Research Board, 131. 
28 Airport and Airway Improvement Act, U.S. Code, vol. 49, sec. 47107 (1982); quoted in Transportation 
Research Board, 132. 
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The Airport and Airway Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of 1987 further 
restricted the use of airport revenues with regards to non-airport facilities.  This act 
requires that these non-airport facilities be substantially, as well as directly, related to air 
transportation.  The FAA Authorization Act of 1994 further added a reporting 
requirement, such that airport authorities must now provide an annual accounting of 
revenues and expenses to the FAA. 
Most recently, in 1999 the FAA issued a final policy that sets forth and clarifies 
specific restrictions on the use of airport revenues that have been in place since 1982.29  
This final policy details some of the permissible uses of airport revenues in regards to 
ground access projects.  Specifically, 
Airport revenue may be used for the capital or operating costs of those 
portions of an airport ground access project that can be considered an 
airport capital project, or of that part of a local facility that is owned or 
operated by the airport owner or operator and directly and substantially 
related to the air transportation of passengers or property, including use by 
airport visitors and employees. The FAA has approved the use of airport 
revenue for the actual costs incurred for structures and equipment 
associated with an airport terminal building station and a rail connector 
between the airport station and the nearest mass transit rail line, where the 
structures and equipment were (1) located entirely on airport property, and 
(2) designed and intended exclusively for the use of airport passengers.30 
 
Further discussion of this provision will be provided in the context of the San Francisco 
International Airport case study, as the FAA utilizes the BART rail link extension as an 
explicit example in this notice of final rulemaking. 
Interestingly, the FAA now permits the use of airport revenues to cover the 
operating cost of ground access projects that are otherwise eligible for funding as a 
capital project.  This is a significant shift in FAA policy; prior to the release of the 1999 
                                                 
29 Federal Aviation Administration, “Policy and Procedures Concerning the Use of Airport Revenue,” 
Federal Register 64, no. 30 (16 February 1999), 7696-7723. 
30 Ibid., 7718-7719. 
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policy, using airport revenues to pay for the operating costs of a ground access project 
was forbidden.31 
 
State and local grant funds.  One final source of capital development funds 
involves state and local sources.  These funds take a variety of forms, from outright 
grants and AIP matching grants to dedicated revenue streams such as fuel and use taxes.  
The restrictions placed on these funds vary depending on the type and source.  However, 
these funding sources make up a relatively small portion of total funding available to 
airport operators (1.7 percent of all revenues for large and medium-hub U.S. airports in 
199632), and thus do not have a significant impact on the decisions of airport owners and 
operators. 
 
Surface Transportation Funding 
In addition to funds that are accessible by airport owners/operators, a separate 
pool of funding is available for airport access projects.  These funds are distributed under 
surface transportation project programs administered by the Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA) and the Federal Transit Administration (FTA).  However, unlike 
the airport funding sources described above, FHWA and FTA funding sources are 
distributed to a wide variety of projects and agencies, resulting in a tremendous demand 
for these funds that far exceeds the supply available. 
                                                 
31 Transportation Research Board, 132. 
32 Ibid., 130.  See table 2.1, supra. 
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In order to determine which projects receive these limited funds, each state33 
creates a ‘transportation improvement program,’ which outlines surface transportation 
projects that the state wishes to undertake.  These transportation improvement programs 
identify all projects that the state wishes to receive federal financing for at least the next 
three fiscal years.  Most importantly, the projects listed in the state’s transportation 
improvement program are prioritized by importance, as generally only those projects that 
are high enough on the priority scale will receive FHWA and/or FTA funding. 
Federal highway and transportation funding for capital projects are currently 
authorized under the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, more commonly 
known as TEA-21.  This Act, enacted on June 9, 1998, provides for the multi-year 
funding authorization of federal programs under the FHWA and FTA.  The current TEA-
21 authorization is expiring in the current congressional term, however, and therefore 
new authorizing legislation will need to be enacted by congress during the upcoming 
congressional session. 
TEA-21 also sets forth the various programs under which funds may be 
distributed, as well as formulas for the distribution of these funds under each program.  
The majority of funds under TEA-21 are left open to the individual states, as long as the 
various eligibility, matching, and distribution requirements are met.  A smaller amount of 
funding is allocated within TEA-21 to specific projects, states, or both.  Further, 
Congress has also ‘earmarked’ some portions of these funds to go towards specific 
projects that it feels are essential or otherwise deserving of special consideration.  A list 
of the significant programs funded by TEA-21 is available in table 2-5. 
 
                                                 
33 In large metropolitan areas, the state must work with the MPO. 
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   Coordination  
Program project Funding Eligible Projects State MPO Other 
Comments and 
additional 
information 
Surface 
Transportation 
Program (STP) (a) 
Apportionment 
($33.3 billion for 
FYs 1998-2003) 
Construction, 
rehabilitation, 
resurfacing, traffic 
and other 
improvements for 
highways and bridges 
X X X (b) STP funds 
apportioned 
according to a 
formula: 25% 
based on the ration 
of state lanes to 
U.S. lane miles, 
35% based on the 
ratio of state tax 
payments into the 
Highway Trust 
Fund, 40% based 
on the ratio of state 
vehicle miles 
traveled to all U.S. 
miles traveled. 
STP Set-Aside 
for Safety 
Improvements 
10% of STP 
apportionments 
Safety improvements 
on any public road 
including rail and 
highway crossings 
and hazard 
elimination projects 
X X   
STP Set-Aside for 
Transportation 
Enhancements 
10% of STP 
apportionments 
Pedestrian facilities, 
landscaping, 
environmental 
mitigation, control of 
outdoor advertising, 
etc. 
X    
Congestion 
Mitigation and Air 
Quality 
Improvement 
Program 
$8.1 billion 
authorized for 
FYs 1998-2003 
(based on county 
air quality) 
Control measures for 
Clean Air Act 
projects, traffic 
management, 
intermodal freight 
projects, fare/fee 
subsidy programs 
X X  If a state has no 
ozone or carbon 
monoxide 
problems, the funds 
may be used for 
STP eligible 
purposes. 
Metropolitan 
Planning Funds 
Apportioned to 
states based on 
the size of urban 
population 
Inventories or routes 
for condition and 
capacity, predictions 
of employment, 
population, and 
growth to assess 
current and future 
transportation needs 
X X  MPOs are 
responsible for 
developing a long-
range 
transportation plan 
and transportation 
improvement plan. 
National Corridor 
Planning and 
Development 
Program 
$140 million for 
each of FYs 
1999-2003 
Feasibility studies, 
corridor planning, 
and design, location 
and routing studies, 
environmental review 
and construction 
X X   
Intelligent 
Transportation 
Systems 
$679 million for 
FYs 1998-2003 
In metropolitan areas, 
funds are for 
integrating systems; 
X   At least 10% of the 
funding will be 
directed towards 
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Integration (c) outside metropolitan 
areas, funds may be 
used for installation 
costs 
rural areas 
Surface 
Transportation 
Research 
$592 million 
authorized for 
FYs 1998-2003 
(d) 
R&D and technology 
transfer activities 
related to motor 
carrier transportation, 
transportation 
planning and 
development, and the 
effect of state laws on 
the above 
X X  An Advance 
Research Program 
has also been 
established 
addressing longer-
term, higher-risk 
research. 
State and 
Community 
Highway Safety 
Grants 
$932.5 million 
authorized for 
FYs 1998-2003 
Funds apportioned to 
states to pay for non-
construction costs of 
highway safety 
programs aimed at 
reducing injury, 
death, and property 
damage from motor 
vehicle accidents 
X X  At least 40% of the 
apportionments to 
each state must be 
used for local 
traffic safety 
problems. 
High Priority 
Projects 
$9 billion 
authorized for 
FYs 1998-2003 
Studies, engineering, 
construction, etc. 
X X  1,850 projects have 
been approved for 
funding. 
 
NOTES: (a)  A separate STP program has been established for urban areas with more than 200,000 people.  The 
funds in this program are distributed on the basis of population unless other criteria are approved 
by the Secretary of Transportation. 
(b) Certain projects applied for by urban areas with a population of more than 200,00 are subject to 
FHWA approval. 
(c) ITS Program includes a separate program for R&D with authorized funds of $603.2 million for 
FYs 1998-2003. 
(d) Funding for the Surface Transportation Research Program also includes funding for the Surface 
Transportation-Environmental Cooperative Research Program. 
 
Table 2-5. FHWA federal-aid programs and projects.34 
 
As indicated in table 2-5, supra, there are three primary contact points that 
administer FHWA funding under TEA-21.  In large urban areas, generally with 
populations over 50,000, metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) are responsible for 
developing transportation improvement programs for their respective regions.  The MPO 
generally acts to coordinate the cooperative decision making processes to include all 
                                                 
34 Transportation Research Board, TCRP Report 62, 134. 
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representative local governments and regional planning agencies.  These transportation 
improvement programs are then integrated into the master state transportation 
improvement program, as discussed above.35 
If an area does not have an MPO, then the administrative point of contact is the 
state Department of Transportation (DOT).  Any federal funds that are not dedicated to 
metropolitan areas or otherwise restricted fall under the control of the state DOT, and the 
state DOT is responsible (within its transportation improvement program) for identifying 
the projects that will receive these funds.  The FHWA itself administers a small portion 
of the total funds it disburses for specific programs, such as border improvement projects 
and certain projects in large metropolitan areas.36 
The FTA also distributes funding to eligible agencies.  These funds are divided 
into three sources, a formula program, a capital program, and a research and technology 
program.  As its name implies, the formula program distributes funds to transit agencies 
based on a pre-determined formula; these funds may be used for certain transit purposes, 
including planning, capital, and occasionally maintenance expenses.  Similarly, the 
research and technology program provides funding for planning and research efforts 
undertaken at the local and state levels. 
The capital program is designed to fund large new transit projects, as well as 
certain types of modernization and upgrade projects, in addition to metropolitan planning 
efforts.  Therefore, it is the most promising source of funds for the development and 
construction of airport ground access projects.  Administered under the capital program is 
the much-desired Major Capital Investments program (“New Starts”).  Further, airport 
                                                 
35 Ibid., 133.  See also Federal Highway Administration, Office of Program Administration, A Guide to 
Federal-Aid Programs and Projects (May 1999). 
36 Ibid. 
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ground access projects are well represented within the projects seeking funding.  During 
the most recent funding cycle, airport access projects represented nearly 30 of the 190 
proposed projects seeking New Starts funding.37 
TEA-21 also provides for financial assistance in the form of loans and loan 
guarantees.  Under the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA), 
created under TEA-21, the U.S. DOT is authorized to provide direct loans, standby lines 
of credit, and loan guarantees to sponsors of eligible large surface transportation projects.  
According to the statute, in order to be eligible for these loan funds, projects must be of 
“national significance,” although public or private sponsors at the local level can 
administer them.  As with the federal grants, any projects that wish to be considered for 
TIFIA financing must be included in the state’s transportation improvement program, and 
the estimated project costs must equal at least the lesser of $100 million or 50 percent of 
a state’s federal highway fund apportionment for the most recent fiscal year. Further, no 
more than 33 percent of eligible project costs may be financed under TIFIA-backed credit 
assistance.38 
As TIFIA funds are loans, rather than grants, the project sponsor must also 
demonstrate that these loans will be repayable through project revenues, such as tolls, 
user fees, or other dedicated revenue sources.  This provision makes certain airport 
ground access projects ideal candidates for TIFIA financing, as many of these projects 
will generate revenue that can be used to pay off the loans (either through fares collected 
for transit projects or tolls, parking fees, and freight surcharges for road projects).  
Further, as this program costs the federal government significantly less money, as it must 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 135. 
38 Ibid.  See also Federal Highway Administration, Office of Program Administration, A Guide to Federal-
Aid Programs and Projects (May 1999). 
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only insure itself against loan defaults, TIFIA funds are generally more accessible than 
funding under the New Starts Program and the Surface Transportation Program.39 
                                                 
39 Ibid. 
40 
Chapter Three 
Case Studies: New York-JFK, San Francisco, and Denver 
 
In this chapter, specific focus will be paid to three airports across the country that 
have recently completed, or are in the process of completing, a major ground access 
infrastructure improvement project.  In one case, Denver, this project occurred in 
conjunction with the planning and construction of the entire airport property; in the other 
two case studies, New York-Kennedy and San Francisco, significant capital projects were 
undertaken to improve ground access pre-existing airport terminals.  Of course, with any 
capital project, the new operating costs to run the system and keep it maintained must 
also be considered.  This chapter will focus on the factual presentation of each project, 
with specific focus on the funding apparatuses used and the political roadblocks and 
successes encountered.  Subsequent chapters will feature detailed analysis of the case 
studies, attempting to focus on the specific elements that let to the ultimate success (or 
failure) of the project. 
 
John F. Kennedy International Airport 
New York City is serviced by three principal airports: LaGuardia Airport in 
northern Queens county services primarily short-haul domestic passenger traffic, while 
John F. Kennedy International Airport in southeastern Queens county and Newark 
Liberty International Airport across the river in northeastern New Jersey serve all 
segments of the air transportation market, including long-haul domestic and international 
passenger services, as well as providing the bulk of the air cargo handling facilities for 
New York City.  A fourth facility, Teterboro Airport, located about 12 miles from 
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Manhattan in northeastern New Jersey, primarily services general aviation, including 
many corporate aircraft movements. 
All of these airport facilities fall under the jurisdiction of The Port Authority of 
New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ, or Port Authority).  The Port Authority is also 
responsible for the operation and maintenance of the interstate bridge and tunnel 
crossings, maritime ports, and bus terminals in the New York City metropolitan area, as 
well as the Port Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH) rail service linking New Jersey and 
Manhattan. 
John F. Kennedy International Airport is located approximately 15 miles from 
downtown Manhattan, and encompasses an area of 4,930 acres, including 30 miles of 
roadways within the airport boundaries.  The airport is made up of nine passenger airline 
terminals, connected by shuttle buses, and an equal number of cargo buildings.  In the 
2000 calendar year, JFK Airport handled 345,311 aircraft movements, 32,827,864 
passengers and 1,864,423 tons of air cargo.1  In contrast, Newark International Airport 
handled slightly more plane movements (450,288) and passengers (34,188,702) during 
the same time period, but significantly less air cargo (1,070,379 tons).2 
Ground access to JFK airport is primarily by rubber-tired vehicles.  Currently, 
limited rail access is provided by rail-to-bus connections with the New York City subway 
at the Howard Beach/JFK Airport station on the A train, and Long Island Rail Road 
(LIRR) commuter trains at Jamaica station, servicing all LIRR routes except the Port 
Washington branch.  The Port Authority currently provides shuttle bus service to the 
                                                 
1 The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, John F. Kennedy International Airport Facts and 
History; available from http://www.panynj.gov/aviation/jhisfram.htm; Internet; accessed 1 February 2003. 
2 The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Newark Liberty International Airport Facts and 
History; available from http://www.panynj.gov/aviation/ehisfram.htm; Internet; accessed 1 February 2003. 
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Howard Beach station (utilizing parking lot shuttles), and traditional transit bus lines run 
between Jamaica station and JFK airport. 
 
Historical Perspective.  Proposals to service JFK airport by rail have been 
discussed for at least the past 35 years.  In 1968, the Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority (MTA) proposed a LIRR connection to Kennedy Airport, using an alignment 
running from Jamaica Station along Baisley Boulevard.  This recommendation was 
revised in 1969 by the Kennedy Airport Access Project (a joint committee with 
representatives from the Port Authority, the MTA, and the airlines) to extend the LIRR 
Rockaway Branch to Howard Beach and the central terminal area.  12 other projects have 
been proposed since then to improve access to Kennedy Airport, none of them having 
been implemented due to lack of funding or community opposition.3 
The only attempt made to implement such service was the JFK Express (more 
commonly known as the ‘Train to the Plane’), which utilized dedicated express trains that 
ran between Times Square, Manhattan and Howard Beach, Queens, utilizing the existing 
A train right-of-way and trackage.  This service did not last for too long, however, as it 
was prone to delays (e.g., getting caught behind a subway train that made local stops), 
and did not overcome the problem of connecting between the Howard Beach station and 
the airport terminals.4 
                                                 
3 Anthony G. Cracchiolo, “The Challenges of Building a Light Rail System at John F. Kennedy 
International Airport: The Influence of Public and Regulatory Processes on the Technological and 
Evolutionary Design of a Capital Project,” in Compendium of Technical Papers of the 68th Annual 
Meeting of the Institute of Transportation Engineers [CD-ROM] (Washington, D.C.: Institute of 
Transportation Engineers, August 1998), 4. 
4 Lawrence F. Cunningham and James H. Gerlach, Ground Access Assessment of North American Airport 
Locations (Denver, CO: University of Colorado at Denver, September 1996), II-131, NTIS, PB97-155345. 
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Cunningham and Gerlach identified three primary impediments towards improved 
ground access at Kennedy Airport: community opposition, capacity constraints on 
existing right-of-way, and lack of ready funding.5  Although JFK airport abuts Jamaica 
Bay on one side, a number of residential neighborhoods surround it on others, including 
Howard Beach, Ozone Park, Locust Manor, and Rosedale.  These communities tend to be 
adversely effected by any construction project, both in short-term construction 
annoyances, as well as the lasting impacts of increased noise levels, particularly from 
additional roadways. 
These geographical restrictions also tend to restrict what can be accomplished in 
terms of improved ground access.  Building extensive new right-of-ways would require 
either the condemnation of multiple dwellings and businesses, or the additional expense 
of tunneling, as very little clear land remains.  Thus, most of the ideas that were proposed 
depended on utilizing existing right-of-ways, rather than building new ones.  However, 
the current right-of-ways generally operate at capacity, and have very little room for 
additional services.  As mentioned above, one of the primary reasons the JFK Express 
failed was because of delays experienced due to the local subway trains running on the 
same tracks.  Similarly, the commuter rail lines are also at capacity, making it difficult to 
implement a dedicated airport service with any reasonable frequency.  Finally, the good 
of the many must be weighed against the good of the few; hundreds of thousands of 
commuters depend on the local roads and transit infrastructure daily, while only about 
54,000 individuals per day would utilize a dedicated transit service to get to and from the 
airport.6 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
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Implementation of the JFK AirTrain.  Port Authority officials project that 
Kennedy Airport may need to handle as many as 37 million passengers by the middle of 
this decade, and project that 45 million passengers per year will be utilizing JFK by 2013.  
However, they also have noted that the airport is close to its capacity in terms of ground 
access; without significant improvements to both the rail and road network, Kennedy 
Airport will not be able to handle these increased passenger loads.7 
Specifically, the Port Authority has determined that the current capacity of the on-
airport roadway system would enable Kennedy Airport to handle the projected loads of 
45 million passengers per year.  However, the roadways leading into the airport are much 
more congested, and can only handle a maximum of 37 million passengers per year.  
Further, this figure represents a maximum capacity; the level of service is already 
degraded with only 32 million passengers per year using Kennedy Airport.  Quite 
frequently, the Van Wyck Expressway (which serves as the primary access road to JFK) 
turns into a six-lane parking lot, and even when traffic is moving, travel times are highly 
variable.8 
As part of a total improvement package for Kennedy Airport, known as JFK 
2000, the Port Authority recommended the construction of a Central Terminal Complex 
with a people-mover system to connect the landside airline terminals.  Although the 
Central Terminal Complex concept was eliminated in further revisions of the JFK 2000 
plan, the concept of having a people mover connect the nine passenger terminals was 
                                                 
7 Cracchiolo, 1. 
8 Ibid., 2-3. 
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transformed into a separate project which developed into the Automated Guideway 
Transit (AGT) system.9 
Other options were considered, but deemed inadequate to support JFK’s growth, 
or infeasible due to cost or environmental requirements.  Expansions and improvements 
to the existing roadway infrastructure were ruled out due to environmental issues, as well 
as the problem of obtaining additional right-of-way for highway expansion.  An 
extension to the New York City Subway was also proposed; however, as with the JFK 
Express, capacity on the main trunk line was insufficient to provide a regularly scheduled 
service with frequent headways, particularly during rush hour.  Extensions to the LIRR 
were once again proposed, but as with the subway option, main line capacity would have 
restricted the ability to offer frequent service to the airport.10 
As initially planned, the AGT system consisted of a 22-mile stand-alone system 
connecting all of the JFK passenger terminals with the Howard Beach subway station 
(also serving long-term and employee parking lots) and Federal Circle (the location of 
many car rental companies at Kennedy Airport), and the Jamaica LIRR/Subway station.  
The AGT would continue onward to provide connections to the LIRR and the 7 train at 
Willets Point, LaGuardia Airport, the E, F, G, and R trains11 at Queens Plaza, with a final 
terminus at 59th Street and Lexington Avenue in Manhattan, providing connections to the 
N, R, 4, 5, and 6 trains. 
This ambitious project, with an estimated cost of over $4 billion, died because of 
two primary reasons.  First, although a number of key constituencies supported the AGT, 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 7. 
10 Ibid., 6-7. 
11 Queens Plaza is currently served by the E, G, R, and V trains due to route changes made in the summer 
of 2001. 
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including elected officials, regional businesses, and environmental advocacy groups, 
many objections to this project were also voiced.  Primary concerns included the noise 
and visual impact of an elevated transit system on the residential neighborhoods that it 
passed through, as well as a concern that the already overburdened Lexington Avenue 
subway line in Manhattan would suddenly have even more passengers riding the 4, 5, and 
6 trains to access the AGT. 
Second, and perhaps even more significant, was the price tag attached to the 
project.  Although the Port Authority initially proposed using Passenger Facility Charge 
(PFC) revenues as the sole financing tool, it quickly became obvious that it would not be 
possible to leverage the amount of capital necessary to complete such an ambitious 
project.  Further, a number of groups objected to the use of PFC revenues to build the 
AGT, with the Air Transport Association (ATA)12 leading the opposition.  The ATA 
argued that improved access to the airports is the responsibility of local and state 
government, and that the AGT, even the on-airport portion, was not eligible to use PFC 
revenues under the current regulations.13  Interestingly, one of the primary reasons that 
the ATA is against the AirTrain project is that the airlines feared (correctly) that this 
project could set a nationwide precedent for the use of PFC funds.14 
In an attempt to deal with the concerns raised over the AGT project, as well as to 
significantly cut the project cost, the Port Authority proposed the JFK AirTrain, a new 
light rail system running on elevated guideways on and adjacent to airport property.  A 
1.8 mile loop has been designed to link the nine passenger terminals; a 3.3 mile extension 
continues onward towards the Federal Circle rental car area, long term and employee 
                                                 
12 The ATA is the trade organization that represents all of the major U.S. passenger and cargo airlines. 
13 Ibid., 8-9. 
14 “An Airport Link With Potential,” New York Times, 29 May 1999, sec. A, p. 14. 
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parking lots, as well as the Howard Beach subway station.  The second phase of the 
AirTrain project is a three mile extension from Federal Circle, running in the Van Wyck 
expressway (on an elevated structure above the median) to the Jamaica LIRR/subway 
station.15  Figure 3-1 is a schematic map of the 8.1 mile JFK AirTrain system. 
Figure 3-1. JFK AirTrain Schematic Map.16 
 
Also, in order for the possible future connection of the AirTrain system with 
either the LIRR or New York City Subway, the AirTrain was designed with 
interoperability in mind.  Although no formal plans exist yet regarding the cross-
operation of rail equipment from Jamaica station, the AirTrain light-rail line is being 
constructed to standards that would permit either LIRR or New York City Subway 
heavy-rail equipment to operate along its entire length with minimal adjustments.17  
                                                 
15 The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, AirTrain: The Port Authority's Light Rail System to 
Improve JFK Airport Access; available from http://www.panynj.gov/airtrain/projectframe.htm; Internet; 
accessed 1 February 2003. 
16 Ibid. 
17 “An Airport Link With Potential,” New York Times. 
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Eventually, the hope is that a ‘one-seat ride’ will be offered between Manhattan and 
Kennedy Airport, as well as between the airport and various destinations on Long Island. 
As with the AGT, the AirTrain project remained completely under the control of 
the Port Authority, although cooperation was required with the MTA to ensure that 
seamless transfers would be possible at Howard Beach and Jamaica stations.  Also, 
similar to the AGT proposal, the Port Authority is financing the entire project with PFC 
revenue bonds and internal airport revenues.18 
As with the prior proposal, the ATA and several community groups raised similar 
objections over the use of PFC funds and the environmental impact caused by the 
AirTrain system.  Although the FAA had granted approval for the use of PFCs towards 
the AirTrain project on February 9, 1998,19 the ATA filed a lawsuit in an attempt to block 
the project.20  The FAA had originally found that the Port Authority had ‘adequate 
justification’ to use PFC revenues for the AirTrain project, as the AirTrain would expand 
the airport capacity beyond the 36 million passengers per year that could be handled by 
the current roadway infrastructure.  Since one of the permissible uses of PFC revenues is 
to support capital projects designed to increase the capacity of an airport, the FAA gave 
its approval the AirTrain project, with certain restrictions.  For instance, PFC funds 
cannot be used to cover the construction costs of maintenance and storage facilities, nor 
can it be used to cover fare collection equipment.21 
                                                 
18 The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, AirTrain: Funding and Schedule; available from 
http://www.panynj.gov/airtrain/fundingframe.htm; Internet; accessed 1 February 2003. 
19 The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, AirTrain: Project Approval; available from 
http://www.panynj.gov/airtrain/approvalframe.htm; accessed 1 February 2003. 
20 Air Transport Association of America v. Federal Aviation Administration, 335 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
21 Ibid., 4. 
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The ATA argued that the AirTrain project did not meet the requirements for PFC 
financing, as “it would not be part of the ‘airport’ as defined in 49 U.S.C. §§40117(a)(1) 
and 47102(2), but would instead consist of a right-of-way along the Van Wyck 
Expressway.”22  Specifically, the ATA argued that the agency’s approval of the project 
was ultra vires, as the FAA lacked the authority under statute to grant such an approval 
for a conditional project, as well as arguing that the statute prohibits the use of PFC funds 
for off-airport improvements.  Further, the ATA raised a procedural argument that the 
FAA had solicited and received information from the Port Authority ex parte, 
circumventing notification and comment requirements.23 
The court ruled that the statute did not prohibit an airport agency from applying to 
use PFC revenues prior to the start of a project, nor was the FAA erroneous in granting 
approval of such a plan, as long as certain regulatory procedures were met.  More 
importantly, however, the court determined that the Port Authority was entitled to use 
PFC funds to support off-airport construction activities.24  Specifically, an airport is 
partially defined as “an appurtenant area used or intended to be used for airport buildings 
or other airport facilities or rights of way.”25  Although the Port Authority, at the time of 
application, did not own the right-of-way that would be used by the AirTrain, the Port 
Authority was in the process of acquiring these rights-of-way.  The statute itself is silent 
on whether the applicant must own the property at the time of application; however, the 
court felt that “it would be unreasonable, because likely unworkable, to require airport 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 4-5. 
25 Ibid., 5 (emphasis in original), quoting U.S. Code, vol. 49, sec. 47102(2)(A)(ii). 
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authorities to expend large sums of money to acquire tracts of land before a project was 
even partially approved.”26 
The ATA also argued that although the Airport Improvement Program handbook 
states that access roads “must be located on the airport or within a right-of-way acquired 
by the airport,”27 the standard is different for rapid transit facilities.  Transit facilities 
“located within the airport boundary that are necessary to provide a connection to a rapid 
transit system may be eligible if they will primarily serve the airport.”28  As with the 
previous argument, however, the court ruled that airport rights-of-way are themselves 
within the airport boundaries, and are thus eligible for the use of PFC revenues. 
However, the court did find that the FAA failed to meet the procedural review 
requirements on the Port Authority application when it requested and accepted ex parte 
supplementary materials from the Port Authority, and ruled that the application must be 
reviewed once again by the FAA in order to meet the procedural requirements set forth in 
the statute.29  The FAA proceeded to do this, and upon consideration of the additional 
materials and comments submitted, once again granted approval for the use of PFC funds 
towards the construction of the Kennedy Airport AirTrain on August 16, 1999.30 
The FAA’s approval was once again challenged in court, this time by a New York 
City based citizens’ advocacy group, the Committee for Better Transit (CBT).31  CBT 
argued that the FAA failed to conduct proper cost/benefits analyses, and thus could not 
have found adequate justification for the AirTrain project.    However, the court points 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 5 (emphasis in original). 
27 Ibid., 6 (emphasis in original). 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 8. 
30 The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, AirTrain: Project Approval. 
31 Southeast Queens Concerned Neighbors, Inc. v. Federal Aviation Administration, 229 F.3d 387 (2d Cir. 
2000). 
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out that “[w]hile CBT may have legitimate arguments that a different transportation 
system would have been more cost effective or preferable, this court has no authority to 
require the FAA to design or implement alternative projects.”32  The court also noted that 
“[u]nder the PFC statute, . . . the FAA’s finding of fact, if supported by substantial 
evidence, are conclusive.”33  Having found that the FAA’s decisions were supported by 
substantial evidence, the court held that the approval of the Port Authority’s application 
was reasonable, and therefore denied CBT’s petition for review.34 
 
Current Status.  A design, build, operate and maintain (DBOM) contract was 
awarded to the AirRail Transit Consortium, led by Bombardier Transportation of Canada 
and Skanska (U.S.A.), with a projected cost of $1.5 billion (excluding the AirTrain 
terminal at Jamaica station) and a target completion date of late 2002.35  The project was 
running close to schedule and near-budget as of mid-2002, and testing had begun on the 
AirTrain cars and equipment. 
Unfortunately, a fatal accident during testing on 27 September 2002 has 
postponed the opening of the AirTrain indefinitely.  Although the investigation into the 
accident has not been completed, initial reports indicate that the train had been running at 
speeds far exceeding the permissible speed limit, causing the train to derail and kill the 
test operator (although the trains will be fully automated once in operation, testing was 
being performed with drivers manually operating the equipment).  This accident 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 395. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 396. 
35 David W. Dunlap, “J.F.K. Enters the Era of the Megaterminal,” New York Times, 19 March 2000, sec. 
11, p. 1. 
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destroyed one trainset, and damaged about 150 feet of track and adjacent infrastructure.36  
As of December 2002, testing had not yet been started again, and the construction 
consortium estimates the cost of the damage to be several million dollars.37 
 
San Francisco International Airport 
The San Francisco International Airport (SFIA) is located approximately 14 miles 
south of downtown San Francisco, and serves the nine counties of the California Bay 
Area, from Santa Clara county in the south to Sonoma, Napa, and Solano counties in the 
north, including the metropolitan areas of San Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose.  SFIA 
provides the principle air service to the Bay Area, although two other smaller airports in 
Oakland and San Jose provide auxiliary air passenger services (principally via discount 
carriers such as Southwest Airlines and JetBlue Airways).38 
In 2000, SFIA serviced 41,040,955 passengers, making it the 5th busiest airport in 
the United States and the 9th busiest in the world.  On the air cargo side, SFIA handled 
869,839 metric tons of cargo in 2000, placing it as the 12th largest air cargo airport in the 
United States and the 22nd largest in the world.  SFIA is extremely significant in terms of 
foreign exports and imports, with the total dollar value of these imports and exports 
placing it second in the list of all United States airports.39 
Currently, SFIA is only served by roadway access, principally from the north-
south Highway 101 and the north-south Interstate 280 (via the connector Interstate 380).  
                                                 
36 Randy Kennedy, “Inquiry Shows Speed of Test Run Caused Derailment of AirTrain,” New York Times, 
18 October 2002, sec. B, p. 1. 
37 “Metro Briefing New York: Queens: Airtrain Delayed Indefinitely,” New York Times, 25 November 
2002, sec. B, p. 5. 
38 Cunningham and Gerlach, Ground Access Assessment of North American Airport Locations, II-170. 
39 San Francisco International Airport, San Francisco International Airport Fact Sheet; available from 
http://www.flysfo.com/about/press/factsheets/fs-SFOIntl.pdf; Internet; accessed 3 February 2003. 
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These two highways also are the only principle arteries serving the peninsula, and already 
suffer from severe congestion during peak periods.  Due to the geographical layout of the 
Bay Area, passengers traveling from the East Bay must utilize one of three bridge 
crossings over the San Francisco Bay in order to connect to Highway 101, further adding 
to the traffic that Highway 101 must handle.40 
Public transit access is provided principally by SamTrans, the operator of transit 
services in San Mateo County.  Several bus lines link SFIA to downtown San Francisco 
and other cities along the peninsula in San Mateo.  Caltrain, the peninsula commuter rail 
service, runs relatively close to SFIA, stopping in Millbrae.  Similar to New York’s 
Kennedy Airport, however, rail access does not currently extend into the airport 
premises, but rather requires transferring to a connecting shuttle bus.41  The Bay Area 
Rapid Transit (BART) service currently in place primarily links the East Bay with San 
Francisco, but only runs as far as Colma station, just south of San Francisco.  SamTrans 
operates a special express shuttle bus between Colma station and SFIA which charges the 
normal SamTrans local bus fare. 
These buses, both the local and express routes, represent about nine percent of the 
total mode share at SFIA, and placing it seventh among all domestic airports based on 
bus/rail mode share.  However, if a more liberal definition of public transportation is used 
which includes shared-ride vans, the total mode share of passengers and employees using 
public transportation to and from SFIA jumps to 21 percent; with the addition of charter 
buses, pre-arranged limousines, and hotel/motel courtesy vehicles, the figure reaches a 
                                                 
40 Cunningham and Gerlach, II-172. 
41 Ibid. 
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staggering 32 percent, placing it at the top of the list amongst all domestic airports for 
public transportation mode share if either of these broader definitions are utilized.42 
 
Historical Perspective.  Rail access to SFIA was first formally proposed in 1972, 
in the San Francisco Airport Access Project Report, and the issue resurfaced several 
times over the years, until 1988, when a regional coalition developed the Regional Rail 
Extension Program, which detailed improvements to both Caltrain and BART, amongst 
which were connecting BART to SFIA.  In the proposal, the principal method of 
financing these improvements was through an already-existing sales tax designated for 
transit agencies; federal funds only accounted for approximately 30 percent of the total 
cost of the projects proposed.43 
A number of alternatives previously developed in a 1985 study were given further 
analysis, and five were identified as having significant merit by the Metropolitan 
Transportation Commission (MTC), the transportation planning organization for the Bay 
Area.  These five alternatives were studied in a relatively traditional manner, under the 
guidelines of the Federal Transit Administration’s Procedures and Technical Methods for 
Transit Project Planning.  Upon the completion of the technical analysis, EIS, and public 
hearings, the MTC identified what it considered to be the best alternative among the five 
studied.44 
Interestingly, the option chosen by the MTC placed a significant part of the 
BART extension underground, even though this resulted in significantly higher costs than 
                                                 
42 Transportation Research Board—National Research Council, TCRP Report 62: Improving Public 
Transportation Access to Large Airports (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2000), 13-14. 
43 Cunningham and Gerlach, II-177. 
44 Ibid., II-178. 
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a surface-running or elevated structure.  During the planning stages, several communities 
raised concerns about the possible disruption caused by the BART extension; 
specifically, Colma was interested in the preservation of several cemeteries located in the 
BART right-of-way, and San Bruno was afraid of BART disrupting its downtown.  For 
these reasons, the MTC elected to proceed forward with the plan that best mitigated the 
effects on the surrounding communities.45 
 
Implementation of the BART extension.  In order to connect SFIA to the 
region’s rail infrastructure, a 8.7 mile extension is being added to BART, running from 
the Colma station to a new intermodal terminal at Millbrae station, with a spur line 
leading to SFIA.  The lengthening of the main line track represents 7.9 of these miles, 
with the airport spur representing the other 0.8 miles.46  A map of BART service, with the 
airport extension labeled, can be seen as figure 3-2.  Figure 3-3 is a map that shows the 
alignment as well as elevation of the new extension; the spur line, as well as the existing 
Caltrain alignment, can clearly be seen on this map. 
 
                                                 
45 Ibid. 
46 United States Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary Of Transportation, Office of 
Inspector General, Audit Report: Use of Airport Revenue for the Bay Area Rapid Transit District Extension 
to San Francisco International Airport, AV-1999-056 (Washington, D.C., 18 February 1999). 
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Figure 3-2. BART System Map.47 
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47 San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District, Stations & Schedules: Maps & Directions; available from 
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Figure 3-3. SFIA Extension Alignment and Elevation.48 
 
As can be seen in figure 3-3, the majority of the new alignment is underground, in 
order to minimize the impact on the local communities, as described above.  The airport 
extension is elevated, while the Millbrae station is at grade, in order to provide for cross-
platform transfers to Caltrain commuter rail, as described in more detail later in this 
section. 
At the airport, the BART line runs directly into the new International terminal, 
providing international air passengers with direct access to the terminal.  The domestic 
terminals are about a five to ten minute walk from the BART station, but are also 
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48 San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District, About BART: SFO Extension: About: Project Features; 
available from http://www.bart.gov/about/sfo/aboutSFOMap.asp; Internet; accessed 4 February 2003. 
accessible via the new AirTrain49 system that is being installed concurrently with BART.  
For the convenience of domestic passengers, the AirTrain will have a station located 
directly above the BART airport station, with elevators and escalators connecting the 
two.50 
Another feature of the BART extension, as noted above, is a new intermodal 
transfer station at Millbrae.  This facility will permit cross-platform transfers between 
BART and Caltrain, and will be the first rail-rail intermodal transfer station west of the 
Mississippi.51  This connection will permit individuals from San Jose and points north to 
utilize rail to reach SFIA and the East Bay, with only one transfer.  Plans have also been 
put forward to extend BART further south in the East Bay, eventually as far as San Jose.  
If this ever comes to fruition, the San Francisco Bay would then become surrounded by a 
‘ring of transit’ made up of the rail services offered by BART, Caltrain, and possibly the 
Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority’s light rail service currently operating in the 
San Jose area. 
BART estimates indicate that the new extension will increase ridership by 
approximately 68,000 passengers daily, 18,000 of which will be heading to the airport.  
With the addition of three new BART stations at South San Francisco, San Bruno, and 
Millbrae52, in addition to the SFIA station, further transit options will exist for individuals 
who live on the peninsula and commute to San Francisco for work or pleasure.  Further, 
                                                 
49 Not to be confused with the JFK AirTrain, the AirTrain at SFIA is strictly an on-airport circulator, and 
therefore will not be discussed in detail.  Similar to the JFK system, however, the SFIA AirTrain will link 
together the airport terminals with the car rental center and the long term parking lot.   
50 Anthony Hart, “Making New Connections in San Francisco,” Mass Transit, September/October 2000. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Each of these new station has at least 1,000 new parking spaces to allow them to serve as a park and ride 
facility, although the San Bruno station is positioned close to downtown, providing an additional link to 
San Bruno’s commercial and entertainment options. 
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estimates indicate that by 2010 the BART extension will be responsible for the reduction 
of 484,000 vehicle miles traveled within the Bay Area per week.53 
The total approximate cost of this project is $1,480 million.  Because of the strong 
regional support for this project, this project became the state of California’s top transit 
priority, ensuring its eligibility for federal funding.  Further, this regional project caught 
the attention of the FTA, and through the original Intermodal Surface Transportation 
Equity Act of 1991 (ISTEA), was named one of four demonstration projects by the FTA.  
Along with this designation came $750 million in federal funding, representing a little 
over half (50.6%) of the total cost of the project. 
As this project falls under the jurisdiction of (and hopefully benefits) several 
different communities, the other half of the funding is being contributed by various state 
and local agencies.  San Mateo (through SamTrans) is contributing $171 million (11.5%), 
the regional MTC is contributing $26.5 million (1.8%), and the California Transportation 
Commission is kicking in $152 million (10.2%). $183.7 million (12.4%) is being 
furnished by BART itself.54 
The remaining $200 million is being provided by SFIA.  In order to comply with 
FAA regulations regarding the use of airport funds, SFIA is only funding the portion of 
the project which is located on airport property and which services the airport directly.55  
These restrictions on the use of airport funds also explains the layout of the BART 
extension to the airport, with a spur line servicing the airport terminal, instead of 
                                                 
53 Ibid. 
54 San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District, About BART: SFO Extension: About: Partners & 
Funding; available from http://www.bart.gov/about/sfo/aboutSFOHistory_3.asp; Internet; accessed 4 
February 2003. 
55 United States Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Audit Report: Use of Airport 
Revenue for the Bay Area Rapid Transit District Extension to San Francisco International Airport. 
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designing the BART system extension to have the airport station located on the mainline 
trackage.  Although the wye track design at the airport junction permits flexible train 
routings, the airport station is a stub-end terminal, requiring trains to reverse direction in 
order to depart from the station.  Also, current operating plans do not have any trains 
running between Millbrae and the SFIA station, requiring those passengers to transfer at 
the San Bruno BART station to change directions.  This deficiency becomes more 
significant when passengers traveling from further south on the peninsula transfer from 
Caltrain at the Millbrae station—these passengers would need to transfer at least twice in 
order to travel to or from the airport terminals. 
 
Current Status.  Original projections had the BART extension open by the 
beginning of 2003.  Current project estimates by BART indicate that the extension 
project is 98 to 99 percent complete, with only minor finishing work left to be performed 
by the construction contractors.  However, as of this writing, train testing has not yet 
started, which will require at least an additional one to two months before the system can 
be opened to revenue traffic.  Although BART has not officially stated a target opening 
date, many sources estimate that the system will not be open until at the earliest summer 
2003. 
Although the project has run several months beyond the projected opening date, it 
has remained close to budget, and otherwise been relatively unnoteworthy with regards to 
unexpected delays and costs.  Fares to and from the new stations have already been 
announced by the Bay Area Rapid Transit District board, and remain competitive with 
other BART fares along the system; there is no unique surcharge to travel to the airport 
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station, unlike in the New York AirTrain systems.56  Overall public response to the 
extension has been positive, particularly in regards to San Francisco residents traveling to 
and from the airport. 
 
Denver International Airport 
Denver International Airport (DIA) serves as the primary commercial aviation 
facility for the city of Denver and its surrounding suburbs, handling 30 million 
passengers in its first year of operations.  Opened in 1995, DIA serves as the replacement 
to the former Stapleton International Airport, which was shut down when the new airport 
went on-line.  Located on 53 square miles of land annexed by the city of Denver from 
Adams County, DIA represents the largest parcel of land dedicated to commercial airline 
usage in the entire world.57 
In order to have enough vacant land to develop DIA, the airport is located 24 
miles from Denver’s central business district, a significant increase over the seven miles 
that separated Stapleton from downtown.  Among major United States airports, only 
Washington, D.C.’s Dulles Airport is located further from the downtown core (at 26.5 
miles); however, unlike Denver, travelers to Washington also have the option of using 
National Airport, which is located significantly closer to the central core.58  Indeed, DIA 
is so remote that Peña Boulevard, the sole access road connecting the airport to the 
closest interstate highway, is 12 miles long.59 
                                                 
56 A surcharge does exist on all BART fares to stations located in San Mateo county, which includes the 
airport station; however, this surcharge is not unique to the SFIA station. 
57 Paul Stephen Dempsey, Andrew R. Goetz, and Joseph S. Szyliowicz, Denver International Airport: 
Lessons Learned (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997), 1. 
58 Ibid., 235-236. 
59 Ibid., 272. 
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Public transportation services to DIA include shared van services, courtesy 
shuttles provided by hotels and motels, as well as charter carriers that transport 
passengers to ski resorts located around the Denver area.  The Regional Transportation 
District (RTD) also provides scheduled buses along several different routes between DIA 
and several locations within the region, including downtown Denver, Boulder, and 
Stapleton Airport, which is currently being used as a park-and-ride facility.60 
Original proposals for DIA included some sort of rail access to the airport.  The 
RTD had originally proposed connecting the airport with Denver via a light rail line; 
however, this project was scuttled early on due to opposition from residents living along 
the proposed rail line between downtown and Stapleton.61  Instead, the RTD continued on 
the construction of a light rail line, but the rail line eventually built travels nowhere near 
the airport, but rather a separate six mile line that connects the Five Points neighborhood 
to downtown Denver.62 
Much popular support was also given to a proposed “Air Train,” a commuter rail 
type service linking downtown to the airport.  The airport is located adjacent to rail lines 
owned and operated by the Union Pacific Railroad, which provided a ready link to 
Denver proper.  A spur line would need to be constructed linking the Union Pacific to the 
terminal buildings, and it was proposed that it be constructed down the median of Peña 
Boulevard.  Indeed, adequate space was left in the median strip to permit this option to be 
constructed, although this option has not yet been exercised. 
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62 Ibid. 
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Construction costs for this option are projected to be $140 million, relatively 
inexpensive as far as rail projects are concerned, primarily because half of the required 
trackage already exists.  Additional stops would be located at the former Stapleton 
International Airport, as well as in the community of Aurora.  The city of Denver 
estimated that the train would carry 5,840 riders daily during its initial year of 
operation.63 
Of course, any such rail link between downtown Denver and DIA would only be 
able to serve a small proportion of the traffic to the airport, particularly because a 
significant percentage of travelers are coming from the Denver suburbs, and as far out as 
the Front Range communities, areas that are at best poorly serviced by public 
transportation, and any “Air Train” or light rail system would not provide service to these 
areas.  However, it is still felt that such a service would reduce traffic congestion at the 
airport, as well as mitigate air pollution problems as fewer automobile trips would be 
taken. 
Dempsey, Goetz and Szyliowicz argue that although a number of ideas were 
floated for enhanced ground access to the new Denver International Airport, very little 
was done to turn these plans into actuality because no one was responsible for this aspect 
of the new airport.  As they point out, “even after the two referenda [approving the 
construction of a new airport], the EIS approval, and groundbreaking in 1989, it took 
several years for ground transportation planners from the City of Denver, Adams County, 
DRCOG [Denver Regional Council of Governments], the Regional Transportation 
District (RTD), and Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT), in addition to local 
politicians, the media, and the public at large, to realize that a new airport 24 miles away 
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from downtown needed a coordinated and comprehensive plan to address ground access 
issues.  Because no one agency had dominant responsibility for ground access to the 
airport, the issue was neglected and it turned into a complex interjurisdictional interface 
problem.”64 
A prime example of what happened when ground access was ignored can be seen 
from the original master plan for DIA.  The original location of the cargo facilities at DIA 
were on the north side of the airfield, far from any major access roads.  Trucks 
transporting cargo to and from the airport would have been required to travel on 
secondary roadways in Adams County in order to access the cargo facilities, rather than 
using Peña Boulevard from Interstate 70.  In 1993, four years after airport construction 
began and after the areas planned for the cargo facilities had been graded, it was decided 
that the cargo facilities should be located on the south side of DIA, providing 
significantly easier access to the interstate.  This late change to the airport project is 
estimated to have added more than $50 million to DIA’s total cost.65 
Further, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) actually offered a $75 
million grant to build Peña Boulevard, but the city turned down this money and elected to 
use bond proceeds to construct the road.  One of the primary requirements for the use of 
FWHA funds was that the access road only have two points of access (Interstate 70 and a 
future beltway) before reaching the airport terminals.  However, the city wanted to 
encourage development along the access road, even though such development would just 
add to the congestion along Peña Boulevard, and therefore refused these FHWA grant 
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funds—not that the private developers complained about this decision.66  The very layout 
of the boulevard (a dogleg rather than a straight line) is still a mystery; explanations 
range from compatibility with future runway expansions to an underhanded attempt to 
make sure the road passed by the property of specific individuals that the city wanted to 
‘thank.’67  
Indeed, one of the primary revenue generators for the airport is its parking 
facilities, with 14,000+ parking stalls available for travelers to use.  Given the financial 
difficulty that the City of Denver is currently subjected to with regards to the airport, due 
to significant cost overruns from the original construction, it is difficult to envision the 
City of Denver giving strong support to any project that would reduce the parking 
revenues generated. 
 
Current Status.  Denver International Airport is still without any sort of rail 
connection to downtown (or anywhere else), and the principle manner of accessing DIA 
is via private automobile.  Although some alternatives exist, including scheduled buses 
and private van services, a significant majority of both passengers and employees utilize 
private vehicles to get to and from the airport.  The relative remoteness of the airport 
location makes it difficult to develop any sort of comprehensive ground access plans for 
DIA. 
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Chapter Four 
The Carrot and the Stick: Developing Funding Incentives to Encourage 
Organizational Efficiencies 
 
In the previous chapter, significant issues and projects relating to the ground 
access of three major United States airports was set forth; in this chapter, various 
information gleaned from these case studies, including managerial knowledge, legal 
precedents, and organizational structures, will be used to develop a proposal for a 
comprehensive federal scheme to develop airport ground access projects of all sorts. 
Three principle areas of concern will be identified, and each one will be discussed 
in turn.  First, it is important that any airport ground access project be considered from 
both the airport owner/operator’s perspective as well as the regional or state 
transportation authority’s point of view.  A project that remains one-sided will often fall 
short in its attempts to improve ground transportation connectivity, or perhaps even 
duplicate services that are already offered. 
Second, although it is important to have all sides represented, project efficiency is 
improved if a “go-to” organization is appointed to take primary responsibility for the 
everyday construction of the project.  Although major decisions should be presented to all 
parties for consideration and approval, minor decisions are best made by the individual or 
group that is in closest contact with the daily operations and construction progress.  
Finally, the ever-pressing issue of financing such projects will be discussed, and ideas 
presented on how to best use the limited funding sources that are currently available. 
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Group Consensus vs. Going It Alone 
Traditionally, a single organizational entity takes charge of any large project, 
including airport ground access projects.  Sometimes, the airport owner/operator feels 
that it is necessary to improve the access infrastructure, and takes the initiative to 
complete this project; other times, the state or regional transportation authority will 
organize and fund the desired improvements. 
A prime example of this phenomenon is the AirTrain project at New York’s 
Kennedy Airport.  As discussed in chapter three, the AirTrain has been built completely 
under the authority of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority).  
Although the Port Authority had to cooperate with several other agencies in order to 
complete this project, the Port Authority executed most of the planning and dealt with all 
of the funding requirements for the JFK AirTrain. 
Because of this, the AirTrain was designed and constructed in a matter that most 
benefits the Port Authority and its needs.  Principally, the Port Authority was looking for 
a way to increase the landside terminal capacity, as projections indicated that the next 
capacity hurdle for the airport was not airfield capacity, but rather a limit on the number 
of individuals who could access the airport using the current roadway infrastructure.  
Therefore, the AirTrain was primarily designed to enhance the landside passenger 
capacity of JFK airport, by creating a system that would enable connecting passengers to 
switch between terminals without requiring the use of shuttle buses, freeing up a 
significant amount of terminal roadway capacity.  In addition, the connection of the 
AirTrain to the rental car facilities at Federal Circle remove even more traffic from the 
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roadways, as currently each individual car rental company circulates its own bus fleet to 
transport individuals between their facilities and the terminal.1 
The Port Authority also acknowledged that public transportation access to JFK 
airport was very poor, and research results indicate that poor access to the New York 
airports is one of the primary reasons why firms have relocated out of the New York 
area.2  Therefore, the Port Authority did design the AirTrain to connect with the New 
York City Subway and Long Island Rail Road commuter rail services.  However, this 
was not the primary motivation for the Port Authority to develop the JFK AirTrain 
system. 
This is primarily evidenced by the Port Authority’s desire to use Passenger 
Facility Charges as the principle mechanism for financing this project.  The Port 
Authority realized that ground access projects are only eligible if they are for the 
exclusive airport use, and had to be careful to design its system within the boundaries set 
by the FAA for using PFCs.3  Although the JFK case did create some legal precedence in 
using PFC fees for airport ground access purposes, as discussed in chapter 3, there 
remained severe limitations on what the Port Authority could and could not do. 
Because of these restrictions, public transportation access to Kennedy Airport will 
continue to remain inferior at best, and inadequate at worst.  Although the shuttle bus 
connection between the Howard Beach subway station and the airport terminals 
                                                 
1 Congestion is so bad that the rental car companies have switched to an “on-demand” shuttle system, 
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represented a travel time of upwards of an hour (the AirTrain will ply this route in mere 
minutes), there still exists a very long subway ride from most parts of New York City.  
Outside of those traveling from a few select neighborhoods in Queens and Brooklyn, the 
majority of individuals utilizing the subway to get to JFK airport will continue to have 
travel times of an hour or more from their points of origin to the Howard Beach subway 
station, and the subway continues to remain a relatively daunting proposal for the typical 
airline passenger.  On the other hand, the AirTrain will likely improve access for at least 
a portion of the airport employees, as it now makes the subway a feasible choice for the 
daily commute to and from work. 
Although the facilities at Howard Beach station are being reconstructed to ensure 
full accessibility to all platforms for both disabled passengers as well as those traveling 
with luggage, the fact remains that the vast majority of the New York City subway is not 
easily accessible, and the vast majority of riders will be subjected to long walks and 
several staircases at their boarding station, and possibly during their journey as well if a 
transfer between subway trains is required. 
The AirTrain is also linking the Jamaica commuter rail station to the airport, but 
this link suffers from similar liabilities.  Although the travel time between New York’s 
Penn Station and Jamaica station is reduced, with travel time in the neighborhood of 20-
25 minutes, the fare premium is over 100%, with LIRR fares ranging from $3.75 to $5.50 
(depending on the time of day), in contrast with the subway’s $1.50 flat fare4.  Further, 
this speed premium is only available to those living near a LIRR station.  Also, many 
LIRR trains already operate at capacity, especially during rush hour, and it is difficult to 
                                                 
4 Fares on all Metropolitan Transportation Authority properties, including the New York City Subway and 
the Long Island Rail Road, will be going up approximately 25 percent in May 2003. 
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envision how additional passengers (many with baggage) heading to the airport will be 
accommodated by the LIRR. 
In addition, although the Port Authority has not indicated how much of a premium 
it will charge for utilizing the AirTrain to link to either the subway or the LIRR, it has 
indicated that there will be an additional charge.  Comparing the similar situation at 
Newark Airport, also operated by the Port Authority, $5.00 to $7.00 is charged to utilize 
the monorail link to the Newark Airport rail station along Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor 
rail line (serviced by Amtrak regional and New Jersey Transit commuter trains).  Thus, it 
is not unreasonable to assume that a similar charge will be proposed by the Port 
Authority for the use of the AirTrain link, putting the total one-way cost of using rail to 
get to the airport in the neighborhood of $6.00 to $12.00 one-way, depending on the 
method of rail transportation used. 
Although this is still significantly cheaper than using a taxi (which would range 
from $35.00 to $50.00 and up from Manhattan), the price now becomes comparable with 
fares charged by private companies that operate dedicated non-stop buses between JFK 
airport and various popular destinations, such as Penn Station, the Port Authority Bus 
Terminal in midtown Manhattan, as well as to various Manhattan hotels.  In other words, 
the AirTrain link as implemented by the Port Authority is a relatively inferior solution as 
a tool to enhance public transportation to JFK. 
In contrast, the Bay Area Rapid Transit District, when deciding to expand the 
BART line to service the San Francisco International Airport, sought out the cooperation 
of the region’s transportation operators and planners.  The California Department of 
Transportation, SamTrans (the San Mateo county transportation authority), and the 
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Metropolitan Transportation Commission (the regional metropolitan planning 
organization), as well as the San Francisco International Airport, all contributed towards 
the construction of the airport BART link, both financially as well as in the planning and 
design phase.  From the beginning, the BART connection was designed to service not just 
passengers heading to or from the airport, but individuals needing to travel between the 
East Bay and San Francisco down into San Mateo county. 
For instance, at each of the new BART stations (except for the airport station), at 
least 1,000 new parking spaces will be constructed for commuters using BART to head 
into San Francisco or the East Bay.  These park-and-ride spaces will remove a large 
number of vehicles that currently must utilize one of the Bay Area bridge crossings, all of 
which are close to or at capacity during much of the day.  In addition, 3,000 spaces will 
be installed at the Millbrae intermodal station, which will serve the riders of both BART 
as well as Caltrain.5  Also, in order to prevent these new parking spaces, as well as 
parking at other existing BART stations, from becoming de facto off airport parking, 
stricter parking time limits have been implemented, reducing the maximum time a 
vehicle is allowed to park at a BART station from 72 hours to 24 hours, except for a few 
stations in the East Bay that will feature special paid long-term parking for airport users.6 
Although there are a few advantages to having a single agency be responsible for 
the implementation of an airport ground access project (a way to capture these 
advantages will be explored below), significantly more is gained if all agencies and 
authorities that are involved with airport access are a part of the planning and design 
                                                 
5 San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District, New BART Stations; available from 
http://www.bart.gov/about/sfo/newStations_0.asp; Internet; accessed 20 March 2003. 
6 San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District, Parking Overview; available from 
http://www.bart.gov/guide/parking/overview.asp; Internet; accessed 20 March 2003. 
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phase, and if each have a stake in the project.  These entities specifically include, but are 
not necessarily limited to, the airport owner/operator and the regional or state 
transportation authority. 
By maintaining a broad organizational base, the specific interests and goals of 
each entity are represented, but are tempered by the needs and demands of others.  The 
need for a financial contribution from each party provides discipline and accountability.  
For instance, in New York, the Port Authority designed a system that was ideal for the 
needs that the Port Authority identified for its own property; namely, reducing vehicular 
congestion on the airport roadways.  However, because the AirTrain project was created 
and executed solely under the Port Authority’s jurisdiction, it is not well integrated into 
the region’s transportation infrastructure, and the limitations of the current rail 
transportation infrastructure within New York City were never comprehensively 
addressed. 
In contrast, the multi-agency planning mechanism utilized for the BART 
extension to SFO allowed a facility to be constructed that not only enhanced access to the 
San Francisco airport, but also significantly improved connectivity within the Bay Area 
as well.  By combining multiple goals into this single project, additional gains can be had 
for a marginal increase in the project costs.  Further, because the BART extension will 
benefit many additional riders beyond those traveling to the airport, the costs and 
operating expenses involved with this extension may be spread out across the entire rider 
base, and not just focused on the airport riders.  This has allowed BART to set the fares to 
and from SFO proportional to non-airport fares, without requiring BART to charge an 
“airport surcharge” as the Port Authority will collect on the AirTrain system. 
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However, there is one major disadvantage to using a cooperative decision and 
planning model.  There is a significant risk that one of two negative outcomes will result.  
The first possibility is that each entity involved will bring its own agenda to the planning 
table, each one disjoint with other proposals.  The result of this is an organizational 
deadlock, where people realize that something needs to get done, but no one has the 
ability to do it.  This can be seen in the history of both the JFK and SFO airport projects, 
where proposals outlining recommended improvements to the ground access 
infrastructure had been floated for decades, but nothing had been accomplished.  
Although this is not the ideal situation, the fact that a problem has been identified remains 
a good thing, and frequently all that is needed to ‘prime the pump’ is some sort of 
stimulus, be it financial (e.g., a ready source of financing) or organizational (e.g., a shift 
in the administrative power structure). 
The second alternative, however, is far worse.  With multiple agencies allegedly 
responsible for taking care of the airport access problem, isolationism may result, with 
everyone thinking that someone else is responsible for dealing with the issue.  This is 
exactly what happened during the construction of the Denver International Airport.  
Rather than confronting the problem up front, the issue of ground access was ignored 
until quite late.  As Dempsey and others point out, “Because no one agency had dominant 
responsibility for ground access to the airport, the issue was neglected and it turned into a 
complex inter jurisdictional interface problem.”7 
In order to avoid either of these problems, it is important that a single 
organization or agency be designated as the lead, or dominant, agency in planning airport 
                                                 
7 Paul Stephen Dempsey, Andrew R. Goetz, and Joseph S. Szyliowicz, Denver International Airport: 
Lessons Learned (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997), 273. 
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access improvements.  This concept is put forth by Cunningham and Gerlach, who point 
out in their study of domestic airport ground access projects that “it has become apparent 
that many if not most successful systems were championed by a leader or lead-agency 
with a clear mission to make the airport accessible.”8 
In particular, the organizational advantage of having a lead-agency be in charge of 
any project is that it greatly simplifies the day-to-day process of any major project, as the 
agency in charge is authorized to deal with the minor details that arise on a daily basis.  
Major decisions would still need to be made in cooperation with all interested agencies, 
however, but having a lead-agency prevents the micromanaging of the project by 
multiple interests, most with differing interests. 
This micromanagement effect can clearly be seen during the construction of the 
Denver International Airport, in which the Denver City Council, as well as the two major 
airlines (United and Continental) that had signed leases with the airport, frequently made 
decisions requesting changes that undermined the construction process, leaving the 
airport project managers “in a situation of implementing changes, the consequences of 
which, for whatever reason, were not foreseen, while simultaneously pressing to maintain 
a schedule that had been drawn up prior to the myriad modifications.”9 
It must be noted that a relatively fine line exists between maintaining the 
dominance of a lead-agency and making sure that the various interested organizations 
have a voice that remains heard during the planning and implementation of a major 
ground access project.  However, it is important to remember that “[t]he primary inter-
agency objective should be to ensure that the challenges of working across organizational 
                                                 
8 Lawrence F. Cunningham and James H. Gerlach, Ground Access Assessment of North American Airport 
Locations (Denver, CO: University of Colorado at Denver, September 1996), IV-287, NTIS, PB97-155345. 
9 Dempsey et al., 482. 
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boundaries do not create significant hurdles to program success.  This does not mean that 
agencies must work together in perfect harmony, only that an adequate level of 
cooperation must exist between and within organizations.”10 
With this in mind, an attempt must be made to strike the right balance between 
these two competing theories.  A program must be developed that encourages interagency 
dialogue, which will promote comprehensive transportation solutions to the issues 
relating to ground access, while ensuring an efficient and timely completion of projects 
developed to further this goal.  Details of such a program will be outlined later in this 
chapter. 
 
Federal Funding and Monetary Sources 
As with most federal programs, money talks, and a program to improve ground 
access at domestic airports is no exception.  Access projects are extremely capital 
intensive, with typical project costs ranging from millions of dollars for a simple roadway 
enhancement to billions of dollars for a large project such as the JFK AirTrain or the 
BART extension to San Francisco International Airport.  Airport operators and transit 
administrators are always on the lookout for additional sources of funding to complete 
such projects, and welcome any additional monetary sources. 
At the same time, this provides incredible leverage to the parties that distribute the 
funds.  As with most federal funding legislation, certain requirements must be met in 
order to be eligible to receive funding, and funding for airport ground access projects 
would be no different.  These requirements can be used to shape the course of a project, 
either by setting specific details as to how the money must be used, or by providing for 
                                                 
10 Cunningham and Gerlach, IV-287. 
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the oversight of the funded projects by another interested party (for instance, the FAA or 
the FTA).  Throughout the course of this chapter, various such requirements will be 
proposed and detailed, and their potential impact will be analyzed. 
As discussed in chapter 2, federal funding programs are not just limited to 
outright grants, although understandably this is the most desired type of funding from the 
perspective of the airport owner/operator and respective department of transportation.  
Other types of programs authorized by the federal government that remain quite useful 
include the ability to collect user fees, such as the Passenger Facility Charge (PFC) 
discussed previously, as well as offering secured loans or government-backed bonds.  
Unlike the cost of grants, these alternative programs cost the government pennies on the 
dollar,11 and can result in creative leveraging of limited funding sources. 
However, it is important to recognize that, in addition to providing access to 
funds, the federal government could provide a source of expertise and regulatory 
competence, so that each metropolitan area would not have to start from scratch.  A 
central structure under the federal Department of Transportation has already been created 
under the ISTEA legislation to encourage intermodal projects, although this office is 
currently underutilized.  If the Office of Intermodalism were in control of the regulatory 
and funding aspects, with a mission of encouraging intermodalism, each new ground 
access project could tap the resources and experience of such a central organization. 
Understandably, airport revenue sources have dropped in the past couple of years, 
for a number of reasons.  Passenger traffic dropped significantly after September 2001 
                                                 
11 The major risk (and potential expense) to the federal government is if the bond issuers or loan recipients 
default on their obligations.  If reasonable protections are taken in the funding legislation (i.e. a requirement 
that funding recipients demonstrate that proposed projects are self-sustaining), this risk can be minimized, 
although it will never be eliminated. 
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due to the terrorist events that took place, and has been very slow to recover due to the 
weak economy.  For instance, during the first and second quarters of 2002, revenue 
passenger miles were down about 15 to 20 billion passengers each quarter compared to 
the same time period in 2001, approximately a 10 to 15 percent drop.  Similarly, 
passenger enplanements were down by a similar percentage during the same time 
periods.  The air freight market was less effected, although it too saw about a five percent 
drop in freight revenue ton miles during the same time period.12 
This affects airport operators in a number of ways, both directly and indirectly.  
Lower passenger traffic through the airport itself results in decreased revenues from 
various non-aviation activities, such as airport concessions and on-site parking.  Also, for 
those airports that collect PFCs, the revenue collected through this program is directly 
tied to the number of passengers that utilize the airport.  Decreased passenger and freight 
traffic also puts the airlines in worse financial shape, which also affects the airport 
owner/operator.  For instance, a primary component of aviation fees collected are based 
on airplane landings; as airlines cut their schedules to cope with decreased passenger 
traffic, fewer airplane movements results in reduced revenue for the airport. 
Airports are supposed to raise fees to offset this reduced revenues, but this results 
in an increased cost to the airlines, particularly when considered on a per-passenger basis.  
While landing fees are only a small part of the costs incurred by the airlines, there has 
been some reluctance to raise these fees.  Airport operators remain in a delicate balance 
with the airlines; without the airlines, there is no need for the airport, but without an 
airport, the airlines have no way to service the city.  In order to not upset this balance, 
                                                 
12 United States Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Traffic System Details: 
Air Traffic Statistics and Airline Financial Statistics; available from 
http://www.bts.gov/oai/indicators/SysMovAgv.html; Internet; accessed 5 March 2003. 
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most airport operators look towards other sources to raise necessary funds, rather than 
risk upsetting the airlines by increasing landing fees. 
This loss of revenue sources is particularly critical for airports, as much of the 
airport cost is fixed due to the capital-intensive nature of the facility.  Although some 
services might be able to be pared down as passenger traffic decreases, the cost of most 
airport services are not largely dependent on the number of passengers utilizing the 
airport.  For instance, the airfield must be kept operating at the same level of service, and 
terminal buildings and concessions must remain open, irregardless of passenger and 
freight traffic levels. 
This drop in revenue is further exacerbated by the costs being incurred by the 
airports to cover increased security measures that have been mandated by the federal 
government in the wake of the events of September 11.  Although the federal government 
is directly absorbing the cost of the individuals who work as airport security screeners 
through the Transportation Security Administration, there have been many major issues 
that have been left to the airports. 
These costs are not insignificant; for instance, various parking regulations set 
forth by the FAA and TSA require that parking stalls within a certain distance of terminal 
buildings be blocked off, or that vehicles that utilize these spaces be inspected before 
parking.  Either way, this costs airports a significant sum of money, either from the lost 
revenue from parking or the cost of hiring individuals to conduct vehicle inspections.  
Even more significant is the new requirement that all checked baggage be screened for 
explosives.  Although the TSA is handling the actual screening process, the airport 
authorities must figure out how and where to install minivan-sized CTX systems without 
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adversely impacting passenger or baggage flow.  Steps that various airports have had to 
take in order to create adequate space for these machines include removing concession 
space, reinforcing floors to handle the heavy weight of this equipment, and various 
baggage handling modifications such as the installation or adjustment of conveyor belts.  
All of these cost money, and the airport owner/operator is expected to cover all of these 
preparatory costs. 
Because of this, aviation funding priority should, and most likely will, be given to 
aviation security improvements.  Outright grants, both under the AIP program as well as 
through other lines, are the most appropriate form of financing for most of these projects.  
There is a philosophical argument that since the aviation security net is a national, and 
not a local, structure, the onus of funding such projects should fall on the federal 
government, and not the local and regional governments. 
It is important to remember that, in an attempt to create a secure national aviation 
network, the security provisions undertaken are only as strong as the weakest link within 
the network.  Within the United States, once a passenger or a bag has been screened, 
generally no further screening is conducted, even at subsequent transfer airports.  
Therefore, it is important that these security programs be implemented and oversight be 
provided from the federal level, to ensure uniformity and consistency of the security 
requirements.  In order to expedite national completion of security measures, it may well 
make sense for the federal government to issue bonds based on part of the AIP revenue 
streams to `create a national security fund accessible to all airports regardless of their use 
of PFCs. 
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However, this also means that funding for other aviation-related projects, 
including airport ground access projects, is severely limited.  Therefore, in order to 
develop legislation to enhance the efficiency of ground access projects, it is extremely 
important to identify potential new or increased sources of funding, such as loans and 
loan guarantees, or increased PFCs. 
 
Linking It All Together 
As discussed above, developing the model for a federal program that will 
encourage cooperative solutions to airport ground access projects must meet three 
primary requirements: (1) it must ensure that all interested agencies and organizations, 
both from the airport perspective and the transportation perspective, be allowed to 
provide their opinions and shape the decision-making process; (2) at the same time, a 
lead organization should be identified to take primary responsibility for the day-to-day 
workings of such a project; and (3) adequate funding must be provided to permit the 
various ground access projects to be translated from mere thought into reality. 
It is important to note that these three provisions are interdependent on one 
another; one should not work without the others present.  For instance, even with 
adequate funding for such a program, these funds should not be distributed until the 
agencies and organizations involved can demonstrate that they have implemented an 
appropriate organizational model to ensure that the first two requirements are met.  In 
addition, although it has been left unstated, it is assumed that a project review process 
will remain with some other federal agency, such as the Office of Intermodalism, to make 
sure that projects submitted for funding approval are both appropriate and feasible. 
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First, all interested entities must remain involved in the major planning decisions 
relating to proposed ground access projects.  To ensure that this takes place, some sort of 
reporting requirement would need to be implemented.  As the FAA’s Office of Airport 
Planning and Programming already has jurisdiction over most airport-related projects that 
are undertaken, enforcement and compliance issues might be rolled into this office.  
However, given the historic antipathy of the FAA towards permitting ground access 
projects being funded by aviation sources, this might not be the best choice. 
As discussed earlier, it may be worthwhile to have the Office of Intermodalism 
act as the supervising organization, where it can supply both the regulatory oversight as 
well as technical expertise focusing on airport ground access projects.  Also, by providing 
a common and unified source of regulation and guidance, passing these tasks to the 
Office of Intermodalism may also have the added benefit of reducing costly litigation, 
such as the lawsuits detailed in chapter 3 that slowed down the JFK AirTrain project. 
This reporting requirement could be as simple as having each agency supply 
certifications indicating that they believed they have been adequately represented during 
the planning, design, and construction processes of the project.  If further assurances are 
desired, each entity could be required to submit a report indicating the extent of their 
involvement, the issues that they feel are most important, and the proposed resolution to 
these issues. 
Likewise, the indication of a lead organization may be done in a similar matter.  It 
would be imprudent for this model to always require a specific organization (the airport 
owner/operator, for instance) to take the project lead, as demands are very different 
depending on the unique needs of each of this nation’s airports and geographical regions.  
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For instance, in San Francisco, due to the nature of the construction project, it was most 
appropriate for BART to take the lead in the project, as they were the most capable of 
dealing with the day-to-day planning and technical issues, as well as the most equipped to 
act as the overall supervisor of the extension project.  In contrast, at New York’s JFK 
airport, even if the AirTrain project had been supported by a multi-agency conglomerate, 
in this instance the Port Authority was likely the most qualified entity to handle the daily 
needs of AirTrain’s planning and construction. 
Although these organizational elements are extremely important, without a proper 
funding scheme, there is no incentive for agencies to follow these guidelines.  Ideally, a 
separate source of funding would be created to fund airport access improvement projects, 
allowing current programs to remain as they are.  There are several possibilities to 
generate additional revenue to fund such a program; a possible candidate would be to 
increase the federal fuel tax.  However, increasing the federal gas tax is extremely 
unpopular within the political arena, and would be incredibly difficult to achieve.  
Although this might be a valid option for programs with nationwide scope and immediate 
urgency, such as airport security, increasing the gas tax would not be a viable answer to 
funding ground access improvements, which tend to be viewed as only local or regional 
in nature, and are generally focused on large airports, which generate significant ground 
access needs. 
Likewise, a new federal program to promote airport ground access could be 
created by using money taken from other programs.  However, this might not be the best 
solution.  Although such a solution might be adequate in creating a program to encourage 
capital projects improving airport ground access, it would merely be a zero-sum game, as 
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some other programs would suffer at this program’s expense.  Further, a dedicated line of 
funding would encourage a plethora of ground access improvement projects, merely 
because the funding is available, and not necessarily because they are required. 
As outlined in the past few chapters, there already exists a current funding 
mechanism that airports can use to generate revenue while localizing the impact—the 
passenger facility charge.  At first glance, PFCs seem to be an ideal solution to funding 
ground access improvements.  They are a “user tax” which can be used to fund local 
infrastructure projects.  Therefore, only those who actually generate the need for the 
facilities need to pay for them.  The amount of PFCs collected can be adjusted (within 
federal limits) depending on the needs of the local airport, which allows them to be 
custom-tailored to the needs of each local community, unlike a increase in the gas tax, 
which would impact individuals nationwide on a relatively equal basis, even though the 
majority of ground access improvement projects would be taking place in urbanized 
areas. 
However, certain changes must be made to the funding regulations in order to 
make PFCs, and other airport funding sources, more appealing for ground access 
projects.  Current regulations restrict what airports can do with PFCs, including specific 
limitations on what types of airport ground access projects may be funded with PFCs (or 
other federal aviation funds).  Further, transportation agencies currently have absolutely 
no access to these funds, no matter what the circumstances.  Finally, the statutory limit on 
PFCs would need to be increased to provide adequate financing. 
Although some creative organizational posturing can be utilized to access some of 
these aviation funds, like what was done at San Francisco International Airport for the 
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construction of the BART extension, this is not an ideal solution.  For instance, in order 
to access aviation funds, the San Francisco Airport had to take responsibility for the 
construction of the BART extension onto airport property, including the station itself.  
Further, the physical design of the extension had to be in a ‘wye’ format so that the 
airport station would be off of the BART mainline, and therefore only service airport-
bound passengers, a requirement to receive federal funding.  Thus, rather than being able 
to design the extension so that the airport was a mainline station, which would generally 
be better operationally as well as for passenger convenience, the inferior spur station 
design had to be used. 
Therefore, it is proposed that a new program be developed which allows funds to 
be utilized from both aviation-based sources and transportation-based sources, depending 
on the scope of the project.  Instead of airport ground access projects having to be 
classified as either aviation related or transportation related, it will be recognized that 
these projects encompass both sides of the coin.  Rather than being limited to one or the 
other, agencies could tap both sources of funding.  Of course, agencies would not be able 
to “double-bill” projects and collect twice the amount of funding available; rather, it 
would bridge the gap between projects that exclusively service airports and projects that 
increase accessibility to surrounding communities. 
This concept might best be expressed in terms of one of the examples given in the 
last chapter.  The BART extension project budget is approximately $1.5 billion.13  Of this 
total, about $200 million is allocated towards the portion that is being built on airport 
                                                 
13 San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District, About BART: SFO Extension: About: Partners & 
Funding; available from http://www.bart.gov/about/sfo/aboutSFOHistory_3.asp; Internet; accessed 4 
February 2003. 
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property and will be serving the airport facility.14  In other words, about 13 percent of the 
total project budget is going towards what would traditionally be covered by aviation 
funding sources.  Under the concept proposed above, the Bay Area Rapid Transit District, 
as the lead agency of the BART extension project, would be able to apply directly to the 
Office of Intermodalism to secure aviation-related PFC funding, including the authority 
to charge increased PFCs, above the current statutory limit.  Of course, the approval of 
the airport authority would be required, but under the joint decision making model 
presented above, this should not be an issue, as the airport authority would have already 
granted permission for this to happen. 
At the same time, the definition of what is an approved aviation-related expense 
should be broadened beyond the present definition.  Although the FAA recently amended 
the regulations so that more airport ground access projects would be eligible for federal 
aviation funding, the core requirement that the project be constructed completely on 
airport owned right-of-way still stands.  This definition is still too narrow to permit truly 
integrated transportation projects, as almost any integrated project will have portions that 
are not located on airport owned right-of-way.  Instead, the regulation should be 
broadened to permit aviation funds to be spent on portions of airport access improvement 
projects that will service significant demand from workers and passengers traveling to 
and from the airport.  In conjunction with this change, a different measure of project 
appropriation would need to be used; such a measure could include the percentage of the 
physical system that will provide service to the airport property, or perhaps allocate funds 
                                                 
14 United States Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary Of Transportation, Office of 
Inspector General, Audit Report: Use of Airport Revenue for the Bay Area Rapid Transit District Extension 
to San Francisco International Airport, AV-1999-056 (Washington, D.C., 18 February 1999). 
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based on the projected ratio of individuals traveling to and from the airport versus those 
with other origin and destination points. 
With this loosening of restrictions, airport access projects would no longer need to 
be designed to separate the airport components from the non-airport components to 
maximize the potential funding.  Further utilizing the San Francisco example, aviation 
funding could be used to construct the BART airport station as part of the mainline 
BART system, further enhancing connectivity within the San Francisco region, rather 
than requiring that the airport BART station be build as a branch line off of the main line 
in order to isolate it (and the corresponding airport-bound passengers) from the rest of the 
BART system. 
An added benefit to the loosening of the restrictions on these funds is that less 
oversight is required by the federal regulatory agencies.  Currently, since specific types of 
funding may only be spent on certain elements of the project, extensive auditing is 
required to ensure that every dollar used is spent on eligible project costs.  For instance, 
aviation funding comes under the jurisdiction of the FAA, whose Office of the Inspector 
General audits uses of aviation-related funding, including AIP grants and PFC fund uses. 
In addition, such an arrangement simplifies the legal procedures and paperwork 
required to utilize funds.  Under the current regulations, the San Francisco Airport was 
required to execute no less than three separate project agreements between October 1996 
and April 1997, in order to ensure compliance with Federal law.  Further, in order to 
receive these aviation funds, the airport is required to not only construct, but own all of 
the fixed on-airport BART facilities.  Since the job of operating the BART trains is not 
the responsibility of the airport (nor do they have the ability or skill to do so), the airport 
87 
is then required to lease back the station and related facilities to BART.  Although this 
structuring is perfectly legal, it involves additional procedures and costs that could be 
avoided if BART was able to be the owner-operator of the airport facilities. 
Also, the proposed arrangement opens funding towards a wide array of airport 
ground access projects.  Although the case studies in the previous chapters focus on 
transit and rail-related improvements, the majority of airports nationwide would not be 
well served by such an intensive approach to passenger ground access.  For instance, 
some airports need improved truck access, to permit improved cargo operations, while 
other airports would be better served by a distributed bus network, akin to the Logan 
Express service in Boston, which provides ‘airporter’ bus shuttles between the airport and 
remote park-and-ride lots around the metropolitan area.  Also, the ability to spend ground 
access funds on initial operating expenses, and not just capital expenses, is much more 
beneficial to certain access schemes, such as the ‘airporter’ bus service just mentioned.   
Most fundamental, of course, would be the need to raise or eliminate the $4.50 
limit on PFCs that currently exists.  Without increasing the size of the pot of money used 
to finance capital projects, it will be impossible to create any new funding proposal.  
Although the current PFC cap exists to ensure that the financial burden to passengers 
does not become onerous, there is no reason that a flat cap is applicable to all airports 
nationwide.  Rather than having an arbitrary limit set by Congress and the FAA, the 
Office of Intermodalism could review any new PFC applications, and grant or deny 
permission to charge PFCs at a level that would sufficiently cover the needs of the 
organization requesting the funds. 
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Given that both AIR-21 and TEA-21 are up for reauthorization in the next 
legislative session, this is an ideal time to align the language between the air 
transportation side and the surface transportation side.  There must be language in both 
bills that clarify the details surrounding this new federal program.  Further, there should 
be language tailored to each of the two pieces of legislation that permit the pooling of 
resources towards ground access projects.  For instance, in the reauthorization of AIR-21, 
it would be greatly beneficial if language was included authorizing the use of PFCs for 
not just capital expenses, but to cover the operating and maintenance expenses of ground 
access infrastructure.  Further, unlike in the current regulations, a new provision should 
be added so that PFCs may be spent on infrastructure that is used for airport access, 
whether or not it is located on airport property or an airport right-of-way.  Again, the 
Office of Intermodalism would be responsible for reviewing projects to ensure their 
compliance with the stated goals of improving ground access to the airport. 
On the surface transportation side, the successor to TEA-21 should create a new 
categorical program as an incentive to work on airport ground access projects.  However, 
this would require either new funding be provided, either through an increase of the gas 
tax or other federal tax, a shifting of the current capital budget to accommodate a new 
program, or the use of bonds to generate an expanded pool of capital funds from 
anticipated revenue sources.  Further, a local-match scheme could be implemented, 
requiring that the state or local communities fund a percentage of any proposed project.  
Not only would a local match scheme increase the total amount of money available to be 
distributed, it would ensure that communities submitting project plans to access federal 
funding are serious about and committed to their project ideas.  Overall, such a program 
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would be the first large-scale embodiment of the intermodal moniker that was introduced 
with the ISTEA legislation 12 years ago.  Hopefully, a ground access program will 
demonstrate how implementing intermodal projects on a wide-scale national basis can be 
successful in both social and economic terms. 
Overall, the restructuring of the regulations surrounding aviation and 
transportation-based funding of airport ground access projects would achieve the stated 
benefits of increased efficiency and cooperation on these types of projects.  Additional 
funding for ground access projects can be achieved by allowing airport access projects to 
tap both the reauthorization successors of the TEA-21 and AIR-21 funding legislation, 
while still allowing other newly prioritized projects of national importance, such as 
aviation security, to receive their share of federal appropriations. 
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Chapter Five 
O’Hare Express: Applications for Chicago and Final Thoughts 
 
One of the primary motivations of this research is to assist the Chicago Transit 
Authority (CTA) in looking and financing options for the implementation of an Airport 
Express service linking the downtown loop with O’Hare International Airport.  This 
chapter will demonstrate how the organizational and financing structure outlined in the 
previous chapter can assist the CTA in achieving their goals for this project.  Finally, this 
chapter will provide a final summary of what was presented over the past few chapters, as 
well as discuss topics that may be of future interest for further research. 
 
The O’Hare Airport Express Link 
Chicago is primarily serviced by two commercial airports; the larger O’Hare 
International Airport approximately 17 miles to the northwest of downtown Chicago, and 
Midway Airport, located about 10 miles southwest of downtown.  Currently, both of 
these airports are serviced by CTA trains.  The Blue Line runs from Forest Park, to the 
west of downtown, through downtown, and back out towards the northwest, terminating 
at O’Hare.  The Orange Line runs from Midway Airport to the downtown loop, at which 
point passengers may transfer to any other CTA rail line. 
Both CTA rail lines feature relatively easy transfers to the airport terminals. The 
Blue Line is connected to all but the international terminal at O’Hare International 
Airport by somewhat lengthy underground walkways, while the international terminal is 
accessed via an intra-airport shuttle train.  The Midway connection is also direct, 
although passengers must traverse a parking garage located between the station and the 
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airport terminal.  Both lines feature frequent service throughout the majority of the day, 
with Orange Line trains operating between 4:30 am and 1:00 am and the Blue Line 
operating 24 hours a day. 
In addition to having traditional highway access, O’Hare is also serviced by the 
Metra commuter rail’s North Central Line.  However, although there is a Metra train 
station specifically servicing the airport, passengers must transfer to a shuttle bus, and 
then the intra-airport shuttle train, in order to access the terminals.  Also, as this is a 
commuter rail operation, service is relatively infrequent, and focused around weekday 
peak directional flows to and from downtown rather than servicing the needs of airport 
passengers and employees. 
There are several concurrent ideas under consideration to enhance access to 
O’Hare International Airport as well as outwards to the community of Schaumburg.  
First, the only current highway access to O’Hare is from the east, which is relatively 
convenient for those coming from the city of Chicago, but quite inconvenient for those 
travelers arriving from the suburbs, particularly those to the west.  In order to enhance 
road access, several studies undertaken by the State of Illinois indicate that an “O’Hare 
western by-pass” is essential to providing better access from the western suburbs, as well 
as alleviating congestion on the current access roadway.  However, local communities to 
the west of the airport are opposed to this idea, primarily due to the disruption potentially 
caused by a new highway passing through their neighborhoods.1 
Another project would involve extending the Blue Line terminus from O’Hare to 
Schaumburg.  Originally, this plan involved building a branch line that would separate 
from the current Blue Line somewhere between Cumberland and Rosemont, as tunneling 
                                                 
1 City of Chicago, O’Hare International Airport: Airport Layout Plan Submittal, March 2003, 11. 
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under the airport would have been prohibitively expensive.2  However, Chicago’s Mayor 
Richard M. Daley has proposed a comprehensive plan to reconstruct and reconfigure 
O’Hare International Airport, which opens up the possibility of extending the Blue Line 
outwards from its current terminus at the airport for a much lower cost, as construction of 
the extension would proceed concurrently with the reconstruction of the airport property 
itself.3 
The bulk of this plan rests on the city of Chicago’s ability to take control of 
approximately 233 acres of land immediately adjacent to O’Hare International Airport.  
This land claim proposal, which was recently submitted to the Illinois General Assembly 
by Mayor Daley, must be approved by the legislature, as well as the governor, although it 
is generally believed that Mayor Daley has the level of support required to allow this 
proposal to pass.  Further, the financing method proposed is structured via airport 
revenue bonds so that the airlines need not pay for the airport improvements until the first 
runway is built in 2006.4 
A third proposal has been proffered to create an “Airport Express” service that 
would run between downtown and O’Hare International Airport; a separate express train 
service is being considered that would run between downtown and Midway airport via 
the Orange Line.  The dedicated express trains would operate on the current Blue Line 
right-of-way; however, in order to accomplish this, the Blue Line would need to be 
expanded to build at least two parallel passing sidings at specific locations along the 
                                                 
2 www.Chicago-L.org, Stations – O’Hare; available from http://www.chicago-l.org/stations/ohare.html; 
Internet; accessed 30 March 2003. 
3 City of Chicago, O’Hare International Airport: Airport Layout Plan Submittal, 11. 
4 Fran Spielman and Robert C. Herguth, “Mayor Touts Bill to Snap Up O’Hare Land,” Chicago Sun-Times, 
8 May 2003, p. 8. 
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right-of-way between downtown and O’Hare International Airport in order to permit the 
express trains to pass slower-moving Blue Line local trains.5 
In addition to dedicated train sets and express service, it has also been suggested 
that a downtown check-in facility be created as part of the Airport Express service.  The 
most likely site for this facility would be on what is known as block 37, a currently 
undeveloped parcel of land in downtown Chicago bounded by State, Washington, 
Dearborn, and Randolph streets.  Negotiations are currently underway with the city’s 
chosen developer for this site, and if successful, this facility would be integrated with the 
other uses, including retail and commercial space as well as possible housing.  This site 
also makes sense logistically, as it allows easy access to both of Chicago’s subway 
tunnels, which run under State (Red Line) and Dearborn (Blue Line) streets.  Although 
things are still in the very early planning stages, possible features of this off-site facility 
would include flight and baggage check-in options, package delivery services, as well as 
separate trackage and platforms for the Airport Express trains.6 
Second, all of the players would need to be involved in the major decisions 
surrounding the planning and construction of these facilities.  In addition to the key 
agencies cited above, the other significant entity in either of these projects would be the 
Chicago Department of Aviation (DoA).  Other involved parties, depending on the 
project, would include the block 37 site developer, as well as the City of Chicago, which 
owns the land.  As each entity controls a portion of the project, it is important that every 
interested party is in agreement as to what should be achieved, as well as how the project 
should proceed.  Without such an agreement, this project will become gridlocked and 
                                                 
5 Jeffrey Sriver, interview by author, Chicago, 5 August 2002. 
6 Ibid. 
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nothing will happen, defeating the entire purpose of enhanced airport ground access.  
With the right cooperation, however, a project can be designed that will both allow 
travelers to go between O’Hare and the loop quickly and easily, while also adding access 
between Chicago’s northwest suburbs and the rest of the CTA’s rail network. 
Such a project also represents an ideal setting to implement the concepts and ideas 
proposed in the previous chapter to enhance cooperation and efficiency on airport ground 
access projects.  First, a primary agency would need to be identified to handle the 
primary responsibilities of each project.  For the Airport Express train and Schaumburg 
extension, this would most likely be the CTA.  First, although a key component of the 
project would involve facilities directly connected with airport operations, the majority of 
planning and construction details would involve CTA owned property.  Second, as the 
CTA would be the agency responsible for operating the trains upon the completion of this 
project, they are also the ones with the best understanding of how to go about the 
planning and construction of this rail enhancement and extension project.  Chicago has a 
great advantage in that the airports and the CTA are all effectively run by the city, so the 
institutional issues at the local level are simplified.  With regards to the O’Hare western 
by-pass, the most likely candidate would be the Illinois Department of Transportation, as 
it has the experience required to handle a major road construction project. 
Finally, it is important to see how the proposed funding regulations would impact 
this project.  Under the current system, all funding for the Blue Line extension, as well as 
the Airport Express train, would come though the CTA.  Due to this, these projects would 
be eligible to receive Federal Transit Administration funding, including funding under the 
New Starts program.  However, access to aviation funding would generally be prohibited, 
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as the vast majority of this project does not occur on airport owned right-of-ways.  For 
similar reasons, the O’Hare western by-pass would be eligible for Federal Highway 
Administration funds, but not funding administered by the Federal Aviation 
Administration. 
Under the proposed financing guidelines, both of these projects would be eligible 
for funding under multiple sources.  If the proportional use standard is used, where 
aviation funding is allocated based on the percentage of users whose origin or destination 
is the airport, the O’Hare western by-pass project fares quite well.  Depending on the 
eventual design of the highway, particularly the locations of entry and exit ramps, a 
significant proportion of the users of the highway will be traveling to or from the airport.  
As an example, if it is projected that 70 percent of the highway users would be going to 
or headed from the airport, 70 percent of the total project cost would be eligible for 
aviation funding sources.  In this instance, the project could be funded utilizing either 100 
percent highway funds, or 70 percent federal aviation funds and 30 percent highway 
funds, or some combination of the two.  Of course, these funds would include some 
combination of federal, state, and local money, as well as internal revenues from the 
sponsoring agencies. 
Similarly, the Blue Line projects would be eligible for a similar range of funding 
options.  As the Airport Express train would only serve passengers whose destination is 
O’Hare International Airport, under the funding structure proposed above, the total cost 
of the project would be eligible for airport funds.  As with the highway project, however, 
this is not the only option, but provides a range of options to chose from, depending on 
the specific needs of the CTA and the DoA.  By providing flexible spending tools, this 
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empowers the local and regional agencies to determine the best way to fund local 
projects, and allows local projects to be better adapted for local needs, rather than having 
the shape of the project dictated by strict federal funding regulations.  At this point in 
time, the most reasonable financing source for Chicago is to utilize TIFIA funds, 
particularly for the downtown terminal, which will enable this project to get off the 
ground as quickly as possible.  At the same time, it must be remembered that the airfield 
project itself will take many years to complete, particularly since the airfield must not 
only be kept open, but near-full capacity must be maintained at all times.  Although no 
completion date is currently set, current belief is that it would take approximately 10 
years to complete all of the improvements desired. 
Overall, the proposed plan would both encourage development of airport ground 
access projects, which are critical to the stability of the national aviation system, while at 
the same time providing enough flexibility to local communities to design projects that 
are best suited to their needs.  In this instance, such provisions would enable Chicago to 
design and implement a multi-tiered ground access plan for O’Hare International Airport.  
On one level, the roadways would provide improved ground access for rubber-tired 
vehicles from both the city as well as the western suburbs.  In addition, the Blue Line 
extension will bring in passengers from the northwest suburbs, out to Schaumburg, as 
well as provide a connection for the residents of these suburbs, as well as others, between 
these communities and downtown, with further connections to the rest of CTA’s rail 
network.  Also, the Blue Line will continue to service local traffic to and from the airport.  
Finally, the enhanced Airport Express trains will serve the premium market between the 
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airport and downtown, providing an all-inclusive and rapid service for a commensurate 
increase in price. 
As such, Chicago is an ideal location to demonstrate many of the issues that have 
been discussed throughout this paper.  Chicago is already in a relatively good position, 
with rail access to both of its major airports, and is positioned to move ahead even 
further.  With the implementation of a downtown terminal, which will provide a seamless 
link between the airfield and the loop, and the potential of improving the Blue Line 
services to provide significantly improved access to O’Hare from the greater 
metropolitan region, Chicago is poised to make a major step forward in the realm of 
airport ground access within the United States. 
 
Recommendations for Future Work 
Over the past several chapters, the problems surrounding the current structuring of 
airport ground access projects have been discussed.  A clear tension currently exists 
between the aviation and transportation communities, and often causes ground access 
projects to fracture between agency lines.  Although strides have been made in order to 
bridge such gaps, the current federal regulations leave much to be desired, particularly 
with the interconnection of ground access projects with the rest of a regional 
transportation network. 
Scott Bernstein, President of the Center for Neighborhood Technology, has 
suggested the integration of the national rail network into the fabric of regional and 
national transportation.  He points out that 56 percent of domestic airline trips are under 
500 miles in length, a distance that could just as easily, and more safely and efficiently, 
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be covered by high speed trains.7  In order to achieve this, Bernstein proposes a network 
of travelports, or locations that would fuse together the roles of airports and long-distance 
train stations.   These travelports would, in essence, be airports that are linked to cities 
with high speed rail connections. 
These rail links would serve two purposes: first, they would offer an improved 
method of accessing regional airports for those individuals who are traveling long 
distances which are best accomplished by air, and second, they would connect cities 
within a region (such as Chicago and Milwaukee, or Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio) 
providing an added link for regional short- and medium-distance travel.8  In addition to 
providing more convenience to the travelers on these trips, such a model would free up a 
significant amount of airport capacity, avoiding the costly requirement of expanding 
airports, as well as reducing air and noise pollution, particularly with respect to the 
communities closest to the airports.  This concept might be pursued further in connection 
with O’Hare Airport, as several current Metra rail lines run within a mile or so of the 
airport. 
In another attempt to promote the use of transit connections to airports, it may be 
possible to include a city transport fee within the cost of every airline ticket sold.  Under 
such a system, airline passengers would be able to travel to or from downtown on a 
dedicated airport transit service merely by showing their airline ticket, without having to 
pay a fare.  Those not flying would still be able to use the system by paying a cash fare as 
well.  This type of pre-payment system is already implemented with successful results at 
                                                 
7 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works, Planning As If People And Places 
Matter: Surface Transportation Research Needs and Performance for The Next Century, 107th Cong., 2nd 
sess., 15 March 2002. 
8 Center for Neighborhood Technology, Experts Call for Focus on High Speed Rail to Create Travelports 
and Redefine Air Travel, press release, Chicago, 17 March 2003. 
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several large concert venues, such as the Chronicle Pavilion in Concord, California—
within each ticket sold for a concert event consists a $2.75 transportation fee.  This fee is 
used to cover the cost of parking for those who drive to the Pavilion, and the cost of bus 
transportation for those taking public transportation.  In addition to making it more 
convenient for concert audiences, the inclusion of this fee into the ticket price 
significantly speeds up the parking of cars as well as the boarding of shuttle buses, 
reducing traffic congestion. 
Another area that might be facilitated by this approach is land access to water 
ports.  Domestic maritime ports suffer from similar connectivity and jurisdictional 
problems as airports, and like most airports, maritime ports are owned and operated by a 
different organization than that responsible for providing access to the port.  Although 
funding regulations are significantly different for maritime ports and airports, 
implementing a similar organizational structure might prove useful.  Similarly, if the 
concept of the travelport is pursued further, a similar organizational structure might be 
applied. 
Further research should also be performed, looking at the needs and requirements 
of airport employees with regards to getting to and from work.  Traditionally, most 
airport access studies and projects have focused on the needs of the traveling passenger; 
however, a large number of airport trips are undertaken by individuals who work at the 
airport in various capacities.  Although the needs of some of these employees are the 
same or similar to those of airline passengers, there are many employees that require 
different services or are traveling to destinations other than the passenger terminal. 
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For instance, many employees work at cargo handling facilities that are not 
located near the passenger terminal.  In addition, almost all major airports are 24 hour a 
day operations, although very few passengers utilize these facilities during the overnight 
hours.  Because of this, many transportation options are unavailable to airport employees 
who must travel to and from the airport during off-peak nighttime hours.  Although the 
methodologies and recommendations made in the previous chapters are broad enough 
and expandable to include airport employees, attention should be paid to ensure that 
airport access projects consider the different needs of these employees. 
 
Conclusions 
One of the recurring themes throughout this thesis has been the differing needs 
and relative isolation of the surface transportation and aviation communities, and how 
this isolation has resulted in a lack of progress in the field of ground access and 
intermodalism.  Without any one organization specifically focusing on the interfacing of 
passengers, employees, and cargo between external transportation networks and the 
airport grounds, this area has generally been overlooked. 
However, with a strong central federal structure, such as one administered 
through the Office of Intermodalism, combined with a program of financial incentives to 
encourage the development of efficient ground access projects, it is hoped that 
communities and regions will see the importance of good connectivity between airports 
and the region at large.  As these projects, by definition, overlap many different modes of 
transportation, both federal aviation and federal surface transportation funds will be 
opened up for use on ground access projects.  The ability to leverage local funds with a 
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matching-funds program stemming from PFCs and the TIFIA program, communities 
committed to improving airport access will have adequate funds available to work on 
these projects.  Further, the Office of Intermodalism will provide the regulatory oversight 
necessary to ensure compliance with the law, as well as be a source of technical 
knowledge so that each community need not reinvent the wheel during the planning, 
construction, and operation of these projects.  Overall, such a scheme will allow for all 
communities to plan and develop a comprehensive intermodal outlook towards airport 
access projects. 
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